

SPIDLIK RULLA CARROLL ARRUPE

# Ignatian Spirituality

FOUR ESSAYS



**SPIDLIK • RULLA • CARROLL • ARRUPE**

# **IGNATIAN SPIRITUALITY**

**Four Essays**

**CENTRUM IGNATIANUM SPIRITUALITATIS**

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## INTRODUCTION

The 1979 Ignatian Course in Spirituality sponsored by this CIS center devoted one of the five weeks of that course to studying certain aspects of the spiritual direction that anyone making the Spiritual Exercises today should receive. The conferences of that week focused on three main topics:

- Personal prayer;
- The formation of a Christian conscience, particularly in matters of social justice; and
- Spiritual discernment.

To speak to us about personal prayer, we invited P. Tomas Spidlik, former Vice Provincial of the Bohemian Province and for the past 24 years professor of spiritual theology at the Oriental Institute and other theological faculties in Rome. We asked him to speak on Ignatius's experience with prayer, as seen in the light of the Eastern Church tradition.

P. Spidlik, with his encyclopedic knowledge of that tradition, his penetrating clarity and warm amenity, delivered a simple yet profound conference, which we are sure will leave those who read it here with many new, rich ideas.

P. Luigi Rulla, founder and now president of the Institute of Pastoral Psychology at the Gregorian University, gave a key lecture on "The Discernment of Spirits and Christian Anthropology." Proof of the value of his conference is the rapidity with which it has since been translated into numerous languages and published in various periodicals.

The formation of a Christian conscience in questions of social justice seemed to us a matter that simply had to be treated in this series of talks, especially

since the 32nd General Congregation in its Decree had described the Spiritual Exercises as a ministry "of particular importance" for the service of the faith and the promotion of justice that are the Society's overarching purpose and task today.

P. John Carroll, an American who for many years has belonged to the Philippine Province, is currently president of the Institute of Social Sciences at the Gregorian. We are pleased to offer here the talk he gave to the Ignatian Course. It is based not only on his years of writing and studies in the social sciences, but even more so on his firsthand pastoral experience in the Third World.

Finally, we add to this volume the conference that P. Pedro Arrupe gave, to supplement the Ignatian Course, practically on the eve of his departure for the Latin American Bishops General Assembly at Puebla.

This talk of Father General is of great significance for Jesuits today. Taking as his point of departure the phrase that St. Ignatius used over and over in describing the particular Jesuit charism: "our way of proceeding," P. Arrupe analyzes at great depth what the Jesuit's life must be today if he is to live in faithfulness to both the Society's origins and the needs of the Church and world of our times.

We are most grateful to these and the other lecturers in our Ignatian Course for their stimulating contributions, and we hope that publication of these talks will be of service to Jesuits everywhere.

Rome, September 27, 1979  
Feast of the Foundation of the Society

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# IGNATIAN MEDITATION AND THE PRAYER OF THE ORIENTAL CHURCH

Tomas Spidlik

There is no doubt that the Ignatian Exercises are a school of prayer. I remember one religious who had preached many retreats, but had never read the book of St. Ignatius. Eventually he picked up the text, and sitting in the park he studied it for an hour or two. His conclusion was that he had really found nothing new in it: the book told him that God created us, that Jesus Christ was born in Bethlehem, died and rose again, and that we must love God. All these things we have heard in the first years of elementary school, he said. Why learn it in a special course of the Exercises?

The Jesuit Father who loaned him the books was angry. "I have made the 30-day retreat, and you have finished it in one hour," he said. "The question is not *what* is said in the Exercises, but *how* it is said, and the deep psychology that this book reveals."

Was the Jesuit's answer to the point? I have no objection to emphasizing the psychology of the Exercises, but that is certainly not their principal purpose. St. Ignatius's book proposes to us neither more nor less than the principal dogmas of our faith, not as a matter of teaching and learning, but as a matter of prayer. Of course, we learned in elementary school that God created us and that the Son of the Father became man. But we have never sufficiently learned how to pray as we remember those truths. In theology we study Christian dogma, but we don't pray. But Evagrius Ponticus wrote in the ninth century: "You will be a theologian if you pray!"

Praying over the dogmas of Christian faith seems to be the principal characteristic of Ignatian meditation. We are all familiar with the analytical exposition (it is

too analytical, like a vivisection) by Father Roothaan, which details St. Ignatius's way of meditating: the bodily position, the composition of place, reasoning on the matter, the decision of the will, the role of the affections, and finally the colloquy.

It is quite true that we cannot properly understand any one element if it is described apart from the others; they are all inter connected and inseparable. But in a theoretical explanation we can do nothing else but treat them separately. And this explanation of one element after the other can be helpful - provided we keep before our eyes the principal aim of the meditation. What does it mean to meditate?

### *The monks' prayer: a 'theoria'*

It would take us too long here to study the practice of meditation in the history of monasticism. But a brief look into the past seems to be absolutely necessary.

The ancient monks spoke, not of prayer or meditation, but of contemplation. Indeed they regarded contemplation as the first and only aim of monastic life. A very great number of their writings are dedicated to introducing the novice monk to the contemplative life.

The monastic definition of contemplation was very simple. The Greek term for contemplation is *theoria*. And by an erroneous etymology, using two root words *horan* and *theos*, some of the monks came up with this excellent description: contemplation (*theoria*) means to see (*horan*) God (*theos*) in everything.

By its true and exact etymology, the word *theoria* means vision, that is, seeing. It should be interesting to compare the Greek mentality with that of the Jews of the Old Law. The Jews were an acoustic folk: they liked to hear people rather than to see them. Hence their religion was to hear the voice of God, to obey his commands. The Greeks, on the contrary, did not believe what people said. They preferred to see everything for themselves. And so, their religious ideal was contemplation.

The classical example of monastic contemplation for us can be the apostles on Mount Tabor at the moment of the Transfiguration. Transfiguration means a change of the figure, of the form. But that is not what happened. Jesus and the world remained the same; only the *light* was changed, as the apostles saw Jesus in another light. That must be the aim of contemplation for us: a *metanoia*, a change of mind.

There are various different ways of seeing. The first way is to see with the bodily eyes, to know things from our experience, to travel around and look at things. This is the way children contemplate.

But the Greeks were not only famous travelers, they were also philosophers. Philosophy begins at the moment when man discovers another world different from the sensible, when he begins to use another eye, the interior eye of the mind.

From Greek philosophy we learned a very important distinction between two worlds: the visible and the invisible. We penetrate the first with the senses, and the second with the mind, the intelligence. The first world, the Greeks said, is the sphere of appearances, the second is the sphere of truth. The obvious conclusion: the wise man, the philosopher, does not follow the senses, but tries to contemplate everything with his mind.

The religious question is the problem of contact with God. Where is God? Plato, Aristotle and others did not hesitate. They said he is not in the visible world. He is the "sun of the invisible world." The conclusion: the essential act of religion is prayer. Prayer is elevation of the mind to God. To pray means to forget everything that is sensible, and to rise to God. As Aristotle tells us, this is man's true and only happiness.

We know that this definition of prayer has gone into our Christian catechism until today. Is it truly Christian? That is the question! In order to answer, we must return to the preceding question: Where is God? In the visible or in the invisible world?

Not in the visible. But not even in the invisible

world of our mind, of our intelligence. On every page the Bible insists on the transcendent character of God: he surpasses every human mind. When St. John says: "No one has seen God," he means not with the bodily eyes, and not even with the interior eye, the human intelligence. For God resides in a third world, in a light inaccessible to reason. Which faculty, what "eyes" will enable us to contemplate God?

### *The Icon of Divine Wisdom*

Perhaps the best way to resolve our problem is to look at the famous Icon of the Divine Wisdom. This shows us a square, which represents the world: the four sides of the world are where the gospel is preached.

- In the middle is a large circle. It is all one thing, whatever we imagine it to be. It has a splendid surface: that is what we see with the senses. Many people remain at this level. They are content with a superficial, sensible vision of the world.


- Others penetrate more deeply. They abandon the surface and the senses and they begin to reflect with the reason. They reach under the surface something that is represented here by the faces of angels. (The angelic world was for the ancient peoples the symbol of ideas, of the intellectual world.) These are the men of science, of philosophy, of rational theology. Their occupation is to study, to reflect, to know definitions.

- Finally we have a third type of person. He gets beyond the surface. He is not content with intellectual science, but penetrates into the heart of things. And he discovers there God the Father with his Son and the Holy Spirit. He arrives at true contemplation. He discovers God in everything.

To develop this idea a bit more, let us look now, not at three types of men, but at three types of things.

## THE ICON OF DIVINE WISDOM

(a rough facsimile)



We meet in this world three important things: visible nature, the Holy Scriptures, human beings.

- In visible nature, let us take a flower, for instance. The man of the senses is content with the beauty of its colors and its aroma. The scientist builds a whole botanical science out of that flower. The spiritual man sees the flower and remembers the gospel: if God takes care of this little plant, how much more will he take care of me...

- Let us look this same way at the Holy Scriptures. The man of the senses considers the beauty of the handwritten or printed letters, of the language. The scientist elaborates a biblical science. The spiritual man hears the word of God addressed to him.

- And finally, let us take a human person. The sensual man admires the beauty of the body. The scientist admires the intellectual talents. And the spiritual man sees in the other person the image of God.

*With what faculty do we 'see God'?*

If this is contemplation, we must put a final question. With what faculty do we discover this third, this divine reality in the world? We reach surface things by the senses. We reach the intellectual world by the mind. And the third - God? "Blessed are the poor of heart, for they shall see God." Our conclusion: one is contemplative if he is able with purity of heart to discover God in all things. That is the aim of all prayer. And that must be also the aim of Ignatian meditation. If we see the single elements of his directives, they all receive their proper value.

The definition we found in our catechisms told us that prayer is the "elevation of the mind to God." And so I conclude that if I think of God, I am praying - and when I think of other things (my work, my travel, my parents), I am not praying.

This distinction, however, is dualistic and heretical. Indeed, God created all things so that through them and in them we could come to God. All things, therefore, can be objects of prayer.

What did the Fathers of the Church say is the object of prayer? Their general answer was "everything that exists." Evagrius said: "We can contemplate by reflecting on anything possessing faith elements [that is, everything that is visible]." Prayer, like Christian philosophy, is the *scientia omnium rerum*, the science of anything that exists.

We can compare this traditional teaching with what we read in the first pages of the Exercises. Everything on the face of the earth was created for man to help him in the purpose for which he was created. I can recall how this used to be explained in a pragmatic way: God gives us food so we can grow and be strong, so we can work; God gives us parents and teachers and friends, so we can become adults and do our life's work.

St. Basil gives a slightly different emphasis. When he preached about God's marvelous work in the *hexameron*, the six days of creation, he pointed out the purpose of all nature: it is like a school in which we learn at every moment something new and interesting about God.

When I read the text of St. Ignatius's Exercises, I find him saying very much the same thing: man is created to praise, reverence and serve God, and all other things are to help him in this effort. Thus, to make the Exercises is to exercise ourselves in prayer, using everything that enters into or touches our life.

The closing meditation of the Exercises, the Contemplation for Achieving Love, clearly presupposes that we can do this. In fact, this Ignatian meditation is strikingly similar to St. Basil's explanation about loving God in the second chapter of his Rule.

This ideal of seeing God in all things is certainly monastic. Is it also in some way typically Ignatian? The answer is, I think, in that word "everything." "Everything" takes in whatever I find around me: the trees, the Scriptures, other persons. But there is yet another important "thing" in the world: my own activity. It is

important "thing" in the world: my own activity. It is typically Ignatian to see God in my activity, to be a contemplative in action, to be Mary *in* Martha, not to be Mary at one moment and Martha at another moment.

### *How to 'pray always'*

One of the oldest and thorniest problems of Christian asceticism was how to do what St. Paul recommends: to "pray without interruption" (1 Th 5:17). This was of vital importance for the monks of the early Church. But if prayer is the elevation of the mind to God, how can we manage this? Are we not constantly distracted from our prayer when we do our necessary work?

There was a school of charismatic monks in Syria who went by the rather nice name of "Messalians": people who were always praying. Looking at those monks made people think of two kinds of Christians: Martha symbolized the people of the world, who work; Mary symbolized the monks, whose duty was, not to work, but only to pray.

St. Benedict's famous maxim "*Ora et labora*" would seem to be an effective refutation of those supercharismatics. But that maxim does not really dispel the problem. For if prayer means elevating my mind to God, the difficulty is still with us: when I am absorbed in my daily work I simply cannot keep my mind on praying. It may be somewhat easier in manual work, but what of intellectual work? Teaching mathematics or even typewriting would seem to make it impossible to "pray always."

If we follow St. Basil, any activity in which we cannot pray must be banned from the monastery. St. Ignatius, on the contrary, founded his Society to do apostolic work - no matter how absorbing - to advance the glory of God. The time that Jesuits have for prayer in the strict sense is very limited if compared to what the monks have. If I want to be a contemplative Jesuit, I can be so in only one way: by seeing God in my activity, seeing God work where *I* work. God works through his will, and so I must see the will of God in my own will.



Perhaps I can give here another illustration from icons. Take just one aspect of them: the light. Where does the light in an icon come from? From the left, or from the right? In baroque churches, it comes from above, from heaven, and it symbolizes the grace of God. And in icons? It comes from inside, from the heart of the person portrayed. Grace resides inside.

For Ignatius, the ideal is to feel God's will working within his heart, in his whole personality. And that is the purpose of meditation, to have one's whole personality penetrated with the light of God.

Psychologically, then, Ignatian meditation is meant to get the grace of God and his will penetrating, suffusing the whole of man's personality: the divine totality in the human totality, as in the Incarnation.

### *The role of the body in prayer*

Let us begin with an obvious element in our prayer: the body. Is our body praying? In the liturgy, rites are visible signs of our interior attitude toward God. St. Ignatius, it is sometimes said, was something of an anti-liturgist. He abolished the Divine Office in his Order - something revolutionary at that time. Ignatian meditation is "private" prayer. When the Fathers of the Church praise private prayer, they find the advantage that it has no need of special gestures or rites.

We might conclude they are saying that private prayer has no relation to the attitude of the body. But that is certainly not the view of St. Ignatius. On the contrary, he judges bodily posture so important that it cannot be prescribed in the same way for everyone. Each individual must choose what is appropriate to his own state of mind. Ignatius realizes that such freedom is not practical in public prayer, but only in a private room, where each one can pray kneeling, sitting, or in whatever posture suits him.

St. Basil writes: "See how the disposition of the body works on the disposition of the soul, and how, con-

versely, the disposition of the soul finds expression in the body." The official Church has chosen certain standard gestures for prayer. But there are so many other suitable bodily attitudes: why exclude them from prayer? Some of them may be even more helpful for concentration. Why not use them, then?

In the history of the Eastern Church, there was a "hesychastic" way of praying, which used psycho-physical methods: special ways of sitting, controlling the breathing, etc. We know what success this kind of prayer had (it was as popular then as yoga, transcendental meditation and zen are today) from the book *The Way of the Pilgrim* that has created so much interest in Oriental prayer during the past forty or so years. In that book, the invocation of the name of Jesus is synchronized with breathing, and even with the beating of one's heart. Isn't it interesting that St. Ignatius similarly recommends synchronizing the individual words of an ejaculatory prayer with our breathing, in his Third Manner or Praying?

When people ask my opinion of the methods of Christian yoga, I generally say this: it is always dangerous to imitate external practices without having the correlative internal dispositions, to act like the mystics without being a mystic in one's soul. But at the same time, it is not normal for our bodily posture not to match our mental dispositions somehow in prayer.

Ignatian meditation supposes this unity of mind and body and the free choice of a bodily posture that suits our interior dispositions. The result of this harmony is the peace necessary for praying without tension. It is necessary, therefore, to know what bodily position and gestures to choose in prayer.

### *The role of the imagination*

We know that St. Ignatius recommends a composition of place as his first preparation for prayer. This is understandable immediately, if we reflect on it, for the passage from the body to the mind is via the senses, and our first way of knowing is through our imagination.

When someone who knows the patristic doctrine on prayer reads St. Ignatius' suggestions, he is struck by the different mentality. For the Greek Fathers, pure prayer consists in liberation from imagery. Origen speaks with contempt about "anthropomorphists," about those who imagine God. There was a famous saying in monastic circles: "Anyone who says he has seen God has only seen his own imagination." Another similar saying was: "One man said: 'Blessed is he who has seen an angel.' But his friend answered: 'Much more blessed is he who has seen his own son.'"

The reaction of Christian people against this intellectual mystique came very soon, however, in the form of the cult of holy images. We know the tragic conflicts that arose in the three periods of iconoclasm. And then Christian spirituality had many true martyrs, not only for the cult of the humanity of Christ and the cult of the saints, but even for the use of holy images in prayer. But Oriental authors always suspect us Occidentals of remaining in the old iconoclastic heresy.

The normal attitude of people today is to say: If you want to pray in front of an image, no one in the Catholic Church can forbid it. Don't forget, though, it is only an expedient for you to use if it helps you. But you can easily do without it." This is what we hear, even today, about the wisdom of using mental images in meditation. Is this really what St. Ignatius meant by the composition of place? I really don't think so. I have heard it said that Ignatius was a man of great imagination, much more than we are of the 29th century. And certainly I cannot easily imagine angels flying around the grotto of Bethlehem. Can you?

My answer is that, even if I *were* able to imagine that, I would be misguided to do so. The meditation would become an ingenious illusion.

What Ignatius asks us to do when meditating is to imagine the place of the mystery, not the mystery itself. When meditating on the Incarnation, for example, you would be dealing with one of the profoundest mysteries of the God-man. But mysteries are invisible, and so, at Bethlehem what would you see? A grotto like those any-

where. And inside it, a very simple young woman like those you see in your own daily life, and an older man. Splendid? In no sense. Simple reality. And then we go on to see the hidden mystery with the eyes of faith - but without the imagination.

That is what is meant by the composition of place: starting from the reality as we see it in normal life.

### *The role of the memory*

The Exercises also speak of the memory. At the outset of every meditation we should recollect the story. instance, about the Incarnation: there is the edict of the emperor. Then what happens? St. Joseph and the Blessed Virgin are going from Nazareth to Bethlehem, but they do not find a place in the village, and so on. Everyone who hears this will ask: "What is so important here?"

Many groups that make meditations together read at the beginning a selection from the gospel. Naturally, I have no objection to this. However, I would prefer to make a little distinction between reading the text and recalling the story to memory.

In ancient times, the Stoic philosophers gave great importance to the memory as a principal faculty of our interior life. They were impressed by the fact that we see and hear so many things. We receive many impressions, but almost all of them pass quickly - and then exist no longer: whatever perdures stays on only in the memory. And what we do not recall no longer exists for us at all. Modern psychology finds the function of the memory very important in the formation of the subconscious.

Let us apply this now to our meditation. Briefly, I would distinguish three elements in what I know about any gospel story that I meditate. They are:

1. There is the story itself: what actually and objectively happened in Bethlehem in the mystery of the Incarnation. I insist on the word mystery, because what happened truly was mystery;

2. Next there is the mystery as it is related in the gospel and in the traditions of the Church;

3. Finally, there is the mystery as it exists in my memory, the manner in which I have always seen it, how I have always understood it.

For meditation, the most important is this third element: drawing on my memory. I recollect what I have thought and how I have felt about this mystery. Just as the composition of place starts from the real world I see and know, so my considerations of the mystery must start from what my opinion and feelings about it have been till now. My purpose in meditating is clear: I want to learn something more than what I already know, in order to enrich the treasure of my memory with some new aspect. Therefore it is useful to recollect what I have there.

#### *The use of the intellect - and the will*

The next element of meditation is the intellect. It is so connected with meditation that many people are convinced that to meditate means to think, that meditation is the same thing as thinking. Teachers urge young people to ponder, to reflect on what they read. Similarly, books of meditation, especially those from past centuries, urge us to think about the divine mysteries. But what is the difference between studying the Bible and meditating on the Bible? Very few people can tell you.

The Greek Fathers saw that the people of their world liked to talk and debate and argue endlessly about all and any topics. They felt, in consequence, that Christian believers would gain, not by discussing the truths of their faith, but by praying over them. In fact, some of those Fathers felt that *thinking* about the divine mysteries was dangerous, not to say practically sinful. We must not be surprised, then, when we read their stern warnings against making prayer a reflection. They were almost obsessed by the conviction that God is

utterly transcendent, that we simply cannot reach him by reason.

There can be no doubt about what St. Ignatius wants. He wants us to understand the "solid foundation of facts" in whatever gospel mystery we are meditating on. He therefore wants us to reflect and think. At the same time, though, he has the same apprehension as the Fathers of the Church: mere cerebration is not prayer. He warns us clearly at the beginning of the Exercises that it is not an abundance of knowledge that satisfies the soul, but rather relishing and savoring in our hearts the fruit of our prayer.

Let me add something now about the function of the will in prayer. To the question: what is the difference between the study of the Bible and prayer, I once heard this reply: "When I am studying, usually I am reflecting on truths that have little or no practical consequences for my life. When I pray, on the contrary, I always make concrete decisions. It is the role of the will, therefore, that distinguishes prayer from study or reflection." That answer was not wrong, but neither was it fully on target.

Meditation books usually tell us that the function of the will in our prayer is to make resolutions. Alas, we know from sad experience how problematic resolutions are. During our retreat we write out our resolutions in a notebook; a year later we read those resolutions again - and sigh over how we have failed to keep them.

St. Ignatius had a very practical, if limited way of making resolutions. He emphasized the value of the particular examen, which calls for a very modest resolution - but one that we can, with normal good will, carry out. Father Lindworsky calls the Ignatian method the "school of the will." Indeed, many spiritual writers have gone so far as to say that if a prayer has no practical consequences in our life, it does not deserve to be called prayer.

I cannot agree with such writers, however: I think their view is partial and one-sided. (Indeed, the monks of old even feared that it could be wrong.) In what sense? That mentality seems to imply: "I know what

God wants, and in the coming days or weeks - or years - I can do it."

According to the principles of the ancient monks' asceticism, this was an erroneous mentality. Why? Because only like knows like, i.e., only the man who lives and practices the commandments of God can understand them. The ancient monastic principle was that only from the practice can we come to know the theory, that contemplation without a truly Christian life is inevitably wrong contemplation. Through practice we purify our heart, and only the pure heart sees God.

### *The colloquy*

Finally, we come to the last element of Ignatian meditation: the colloquy or dialogue with God. To grasp what Ignatius meant by the colloquy, let us go back to the Icon of the Divine Wisdom and to the three circles we saw there.

God is not in the first circle of things. He is not even in the second circle of ideas. If he were, he would be the idea of goodness; he would be expressed in moral principles. It would be sufficient to know them and practice them. But he is not there. He is deeper, in the center of the icon; he is a Person, he is our Father. It is not enough to think and to speak of him, we must speak *to* him, *with* him. It is interesting to note that Evagrius, who introduced into Christian spirituality the definition of prayer as the "elevation of the mind to God," also gave us another definition to correct the one-sidedness of the first: "prayer is dialoguing with God." St. Ignatius repeats that idea, he tells us that we must speak with Jesus Christ "as a friend speaks with a friend." Otherwise our meditation is a monologue and not a prayer.

I will close this chapter on prayer by inviting you to go back for a few moments to the childhood that we all remember with such wistfulness. As children we liked to hear fables. What is so wonderful about them? They bring us into a special world, where a child can

talk with the flowers, with the animals, with the mountains and rivers. As the child grows up, though, he gradually loses that illusion. We adults can no longer talk with the world of nature: it is dead for us. We adults know all about natural forces (we have learned to dominate them), but we no longer dialogue with natural things. Nikolai Berdyaev, the Russian spiritual writer, says that the most devastating, dehumanizing result of sin is that we "objectivate" the world, we kill all life in it.

Prayer means returning to the wonderful world of our childhood. There, when we pray, we speak, not just with animals and things, but with Someone who is present everywhere, in everything: God our Father.

Contemplative prayer means seeing God in everything. Not only seeing, but finding him and speaking with him - and hearing him. We can be with the Father always, that way.

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## THE DISCERNMENT OF SPIRITS AND CHRISTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY

Luigi M. Rulla

What is the guiding idea of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius? What is their finality?

The many authors who have commented on the Exercises seem to underline two principal purposes: that of the election, namely to seek, find, and embrace the will of God in one or more specific situations in the life of the person; or that of Christian experience, namely the spiritual renewal of the person. G. Fessard may be indicated as a modern representative of the first orientation, and G. Cusson of the second (1).

These two purposes do not exclude each other, nor are they mutually opposed. This is the view taken by Bernard (2) on the basis of an analysis of the text of the Exercises as well as historical considerations. Bernard points out that "every spiritual life aims at a concrete realization of the will of God and at bringing about a transformation of the person" (3). It may be said that the two purposes are integrated, in the sense that the Exercises aim at promoting an interior disposition of liberty in decision or election, which makes possible an ever closer imitation of Christ.

The integration and convergences of the two purposes of the Exercises are further emphasized by the kind of means that Ignatius proposes for reaching these goals.

With regard to these means, the originality of Ignatius is not to be found in the themes selected and proposed for meditation, nor in the different forms of prayer suggested, nor in the rules proposed for the discernment of spirits. Before and after Ignatius, others have listed signs of the good and bad "spirits" in a manner that is perhaps more detailed, more methodical, and more precise.

The originality of Ignatius lies in the intuition that there is a connection between discernment, on the one hand, and election or spiritual growth, on the other. This connection has been noted and interpreted in different ways by different commentators (4). The present study aims at offering a modest contribution to the understanding of this connection, understood in a sense that must now be defined more precisely.

### SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE STUDY

Without presuming to define what was really the thought of Ignatius himself, the following question is posed: in what does the connection consist between discernment, on the one hand, and the two principal purposes of the Exercises, those of election and of the assimilation of the values of Christ, on the other hand? Here it will be suggested that there exists an *intrinsic* connection, that is, a connection that exists in consequence of the mode of human existence and operation. It is clear that the question concerning such an "intrinsic" relationship implies also questions both about the psychic operations at the basis of discernment, and about the very nature of man.

The difficulty and complexity of the theme preclude exhaustive treatment. Limitations of space permit no more than incomplete and schematic discussion of the various problems involved. The reader must be referred to the original sources for a fuller understanding and documentation of the text.

#### *Certain helpful distinctions*

Some preliminary clarifications are necessary at this point:

1. What is in question is *spiritual* discernment, not the kind of discernment that is concerned with "charismatic gifts." We follow here the view of various

authors (5) cited by Therrien (6) that in the writings of the New Testament the verb "to discern" (*dokimazein*) has a connection with the theme of *progress in Christian living*.

2. The spiritual discernment in question is to be further distinguished from moral discernment (7), as being concerned with the choice between the real good and the merely apparent good, rather than with the choice between good and evil. It is presupposed that the person enjoys sufficient liberty to avoid sin habitually; in Ignatian terms, we are concerned with the man of the Second Week of the Exercises, rather than with the man of the First Week.

3. The "spirits" to be discerned are understood not in the preternatural sense of demons and angels, but in the sense of the dispositions of the individual person. In other words, it is the *anthropological* aspect that is to be stressed.

This anthropological approach is in keeping with the anthropological orientation that has become prominent in modern thought, and more recently also in theology; on this point one may consult the numerous publications of authors such as K. Rahner, von Balthasar, Flick and Alszeghy, etc. (8), which are in line with the ideas expressed by Paul VI in his discourse closing Vatican Council II.

Here it is enough to indicate two points of particular relevance. First, it is man who receives the message of God in the history of salvation, who responds to and lives according to this message; in the work of salvation, man is not a mere spectator, nor one who merely observes in a more or less distant fashion; therefore it seems legitimate to interpret the history of salvation in an anthropological perspective, which sets in relief the human implications of all the mysteries of the word of God.

Second, in consequence of this dynamic and diachronic type of theological anthropology, we may validly inquire what are the dispositions in man that favor his attraction to Christ and the values of Christ. Thus, for example, the consolation and desolation described by Ignatius

in the context of discernment may be related *also* to personal dispositions on a conscious or unconscious level (9). This holds also for what Ignatius calls "consolation without a cause" (10). Indeed, as Ignatius himself has pointed out, the dispositions of the individual may come into action in a second phase, which follows that of the initial consolation, and give rise to "various plans and resolutions that are not directly inspired by God our Lord" (11); and furthermore, instead of the action of God, unconscious motivations may be the real source of an *initial* consolation, which only appears to come from God (12).

4. Discernment is intended here above all in an *existential* sense, as concerned not only with knowing, but also with action; this aspect, too, is closely linked with the new anthropological orientation in theology. Indeed, the recent development of the empirical sciences of man has created a fundamentally new problem for theology (13). These sciences consider man in his concrete behavior; this existential behavior is not a manifestation of human nature only, but of a nature in need of divine grace; however, the action of grace may be assimilated to a greater or lesser extent by human nature. Considered in this existential perspective, philosophy has a relationship to theology similar to that of the empirical human sciences.

5. Within the limits of the anthropological approach interest is focused on the *operations* that characterize discernment, and thus on the nature of man, rather than on rules for discerning the apparent from the real good; although, obviously, an analysis of such operations can suggest important practical applications of the rules for discernment.

6. While fully respecting the principle, *gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit*, the anthropological approach applied here excludes any analysis of the essentially supernatural, that is, of the mode of action of divine grace.

### *Subjective and objective sanctity*

7. As a corollary of the preceding point, it is necessary to make a distinction between subjective sanctity and objective sanctity that concerns the relationship of both kinds of sanctity with the dynamic laws of human psychology.

Subjective dispositions in living religiously (subjective sanctity) correspond to the extent to which, *de facto*, the individual makes use of the *free* capacities and possibilities received from God. Objective dispositions (objective sanctity) are constituted not only by the capacities of the individual, but also by those that are not free, yet that could be rendered free. Thus, objective sanctity corresponds to the degree of sanctity an individual would have if all his capacities were free and fully used.

Psychological dynamics - at least, those that are unconscious - have no relationship with subjective sanctity: God alone sanctifies the soul that co-operates with his fully gratuitous action; and if the soul co-operates totally with God, within the limits of its actual liberty, then it is subjectively holy. However, psychodynamic factors may influence the degree of freedom with which the individual is disposed to the action of grace. Therefore, objective sanctity depends in an "extrinsic" way on psychological dispositions.

This relationship with psychological dispositions is still more clear when one speaks, not of the sanctity of an individual, but of the way in which the individual presents the means of sanctification. Such presentation may be described as the visible manifestation and/or social communication of the values of Christ, and may be named "apostolic effectiveness".

Here again it is necessary to distinguish between apostolic effectiveness deriving from subjective sanctity and that deriving from objective sanctity. The former has no dependence on psycho-dynamic factors, at least on those that are unconscious; the latter, on the contrary, has an "intrinsic" dependence on such factors. Thus, for example, if two religious are equal in subjective sanctity,

but one of them is less free because of an *unconscious* need for affective dependency, then he will be less effective in transmitting the image and the ideal of the altruistic love of Christ. Here, spiritual discernment will be considered as regards objective sanctity and the apostolic effectiveness that derives from this.

*Not God's initiative, but man's response*

8. A further important distinction must therefore be made. Discernment may regard the *presence* or *absence* of divine grace in the motivation for which a choice or election is made; alternatively, it may regard the *response* of the individual to grace, that is, whether this response involves the real or only the apparent good, and thus is appropriate or inappropriate to Christian growth. As concerned with the presence of grace, discernment relates to subjective sanctity and apostolic effectiveness; as concerned with the appropriateness of the individual's response to grace, discernment may be related to objective sanctity and apostolic effectiveness; and this is the case when the response to grace is sub-consciously motivated, not by the search for the Kingdom of God, but by a search that, in ultimate analysis, is for oneself.

In general, studies of discernment are concerned with the first of these aspects. On this point one may consult the important contribution of K. Rahner (14); the point has been well discussed also by Dulles (15) and by Egan (16).

The second aspect (which is the one here in question) has come to receive greater attention as a result of the recent development of the human sciences, in particular that of depth-psychology. After all, subjective sanctity that is genuine seeks also objective sanctity, insofar as this is possible; in other words, subjective sanctity is concerned not only with the presence of grace, but also with making an appropriate response to grace. This is what the saints have done, in using meditation, examination of conscience, etc., *also* to discover and bring to

consciousness aspects of their life and personality that were elusive but that were obstacles to their spiritual growth and their apostolic activity. Depth-psychology makes a distinction between subconscious aspects of the personality that the individual himself can make conscious by means of reflective self-examination (*preconscious* aspects) and subconscious aspects that, by definition, can be made conscious only with appropriate help from competent persons (*unconscious* aspects).

In this study, discernment will be treated as it regards the *response* of the individual to the action of grace; more precisely, the extent to which the unconscious dispositions of the individual can render his response to grace more or less appropriate to objective sanctity and objective apostolic effectiveness. As will emerge, it seems that these psychological dispositions are to be considered as a factor that is neither secondary nor negligible.

From what has been said, it begins to become clear how the discernment of spirits, existentially considered, can depend closely on the psychological dispositions of the individual. The rest of this study offers a closer examination of this point.

The way in which discernment is connected with election and with the assimilation of the values of Christ will be examined in three perspectives: psychological, philosophical, and theological.

## THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

If one considers the various theories of personality advanced by modern psychology, their insufficiency for a study of the problems here in question becomes readily evident.

First of all, practically all of these theories take no account of the transcendental and objective values of Christ, which are the very object of the discernment of spirits. The various psychoanalytic theories, the humanistic approaches of C. Rogers, A. Maslow, etc., the exis-

tential approaches for which experiencing is a value in itself and independently of its content, may be indicated in this context (17). For example, it is difficult to see how an approach centered on self-actualization or self-fulfillment can offer a basis for a Christian anthropology, since, on the contrary, the gospel calls one to leave all, including oneself, in order to follow Christ. Therefore, one cannot opt in favor of an anthropocentric autonomy, separated from revelation; also since, as Karl Rahner has remarked, Christology is the beginning and end of anthropology.

It is true that some of these theories, for instance those of Maslow and Allport, include reference to values such as justice, love, liberty, etc.; but while these values are proposed as self-transcendence for the good of another, their measure remains that of the subject himself; thus the concrete norm remains man himself, the measure of value remains subjective, and anthropocentrism may easily become egocentrism. After all, many tyrannies have been initiated and maintained in the name of "liberty." Among modern theories, the one closest to the ideals of the gospel seems to be that of V. Frankl (18).

In the second place, it is difficult to subject any of the theories to a serious empirical verification, since none of them permits the formulation of hypotheses based on sufficiently clear and precise definitions. Thus, for example, the "archetypes" described by Jung have confused and contradictory characteristics, in the sense that they can be at the same time ideas, affects, symbols, will, instincts, modes of conduct, and even hallucinations.

### *The theory of self-transcendent consistency*

What perspectives are revealed regarding the discernment of spirits if, in the study of the human person, account is taken of the objective and transcendental values of Christ? Some ideas developed in an effort to answer this question have been advanced in the presentation of a theory of priestly and religious vocation; and this may be termed a theory of self-transcendent consistency (19).



This theory is developed in terms of psychic structures of the human being that are trans-situational, transcultural, and transtemporal; for example, what the person wishes to be, what he actually is, etc. Further, it is based on concepts such as those of values, needs, and attitudes that may be applied not only to the study of religious vocation, but also to the study of human nature in general, and thus to the question of a Christian anthropology.

In the context of the discernment of spirits, this theory may be synthesized as follows, in a manner that is obviously simplified. When a person responds cognitively and affectively to an object (in this case, to the person and ideals of Christ) because attracted by the *intrinsic* worth of the object itself, then the person is drawn to transcend himself in order to assimilate and internalize the objective and revealed ideals of Christ. When, on the other hand, the person responds because the object is consciously or unconsciously perceived as something that also favors his self-esteem, this does not necessarily favor self-transcendence and the internalization of the ideal. In other words, the response is ambiguous.

If the part of the personality that moves the person to respond to the object can be integrated with the ideals in question, the transcendent values of Christ, then the response to the values draws the person to self-transcendence, that is, to becoming more and more like Christ; and if this part of the personality cannot be so integrated, then self-transcendence toward the imitation of Christ is impeded.

Analogously, one may say that the first case involves the real good as described by Ignatius, while the second case involves a merely apparent good. Thus, for example, one may be attracted to and aspire to an imitation of the generosity of Christ, while in reality and in the last analysis, one gives in order to receive. In this case, the part of the personality that is the true source of the desire to imitate Christ is something egocentric rather than self-transcendent.

*A good that can be real - or apparent*

From what has been said, it emerges that the good that is sought is real rather than merely apparent when the values attracting the individual, and professed by him, are consistent, coherent with two realities; first, with the objective and transcendent values proclaimed and lived by Christ (this condition is rather frequently fulfilled); and secondly, with the rest of the personality of the individual (and this condition is much more rarely fulfilled). Here, depth-psychology shows that it is possible for a person to desire and to profess the ideals of Christ, while, without being aware of this, he is *also* driven by *subconscious* needs that cannot be reconciled with these ideals.

Therefore the individual is *inconsistent* in the sense that he is moved simultaneously by two opposed forces: one being the ideals that he consciously desires and the judgment of value that he has made, the other being the deep-lying needs by which he is subconsciously driven. (The formal principle involved is that of non-contradiction). The ideals express what the person wishes to be or to do, in other words his ideal self; while the needs have a notable influence on what the person subconsciously is or habitually does, that is, on his actual self.

Two points merit special attention. First, the ideal self, that to which the individual aspires, is conscious, but it may be in part motivated by *unconscious* needs that may render incorrect his conscious judgment and evaluation, so that the good to which he aspires is apparent rather than real. For instance, one may consciously aspire to serve the community of the Church, while being motivated, in the last analysis, by the desire for a gratifying position in the community, that is, by a desire to be served by the community.

Second, as many researches have shown, it is possible that an individual be responsive to an inconsistency between his ideal self and his actual self without being conscious of the fact that he is being influenced by such an inconsistency. The person may be unconscious of the

existence of the inconsistency itself or of the stress and anxiety that it provokes, or he may be unconscious of the efforts he is making to resolve the inconsistency.

### *Findings related to the theory*

Research that has already been published (20) as well as research still in progress give confirmation to the assertions made. More precisely, these researches underline certain points that will now be listed, which are based on the study of some hundreds of young people, of both sexes, about 20 years of age, all Catholics, with or without a vocation to the priestly or religious life.

1. In an existential discernment of spirits, anthropologically viewed, it is necessary to consider and discern in each person two dimensions or motivating forces that are qualitatively different from each other: the dimension of values consciously desired and proclaimed, of the conscious ideal self as already described; and the dimension constituted by the totality of the consistencies or inconsistencies between the ideal self and the actual self, existing in each person. For the sake of brevity, these two motivating forces will be called, from here on, the *first dimension* and the *second dimension*. As regards the second dimension, research indicates that it is unconscious inconsistencies rather than conscious ones that possess the stronger motivating force.

2. The second dimension, that of conscious or unconscious consistencies and of unconscious inconsistencies, has influence on several aspects of spiritual progress and vocational decision. The greater the prevalence of inconsistencies over consistencies in the person, the more unrealistic are his expectations regarding his own ideals. Such a person desires and proclaims ideals that more discordant with his capacities to live these ideals than is the case for a person with a lesser prevalence of inconsistencies over consistencies.

The relationship between the second dimension and the discernment of spirits is clear: the discovery and evalua-

tion of the second dimension in a person is one of the elements that is important and necessary for an appropriate discernment of spirits; it helps, indeed, to discover if the values proclaimed by a person (the first dimension) are only apparent and not real, as for example if the desire to serve is rooted ultimately in an unconscious desire to be served, and to give in order to receive.

Furthermore, the second dimension in a person tends to persist, practically unchanged by the passage of time, and to influence decisions taken. More precisely, those who will leave religious vocation within about 8-10 years manifest, already at the time of entry, a prevalence of inconsistencies over consistencies that is greater than that of those who will persevere in their vocation. Thus, the second dimension *tends* to influence discernment and election, while this is significantly less true for the influence exercised by the first dimension considered alone.

Similarly, after four years of training in a religious house or in a lay college, those with a lesser prevalence of inconsistencies over consistencies desire and proclaim Christian values that are significantly higher than those of persons showing a greater prevalence of inconsistencies over consistencies. It should be noted that no such difference in values was to be found at the beginning of the four years of training. Thus, the second dimension by itself *tends* to influence the assimilation, internalization of the values of Christ.

3. All the data presented indicate the existence of a common denominator - the second dimension - that tends to influence, and in a foreseeable direction, the discernment of spirits, election, and the assimilation of the values of Christ. It should be noted that the same cannot be said of the first dimension, which seems, moreover, to be influenced by the second dimension. One may therefore say that the second dimension has an extrinsic connection with objective sanctity and an intrinsic connection with the part of apostolic effectiveness that is linked to objective sanctity.

4. The results of research indicate also that the second dimension exists in all of the persons studied;

and, more specifically, that unconscious inconsistencies are present in all, though their degree, in proportion to consistencies also present, is variable.

### *Nature of the second dimension*

On the basis of the facts presented, some considerations on the nature of the second dimension may be formulated. Some of its constitutive elements have been presented, as also some of its influences on the dynamics of the person. It will now be useful to make clear the difference of this second dimension from both sin and psychopathology.

As will be seen in more detail below, the second dimension excludes the responsibility of the individual, at least within the limits in which he is moved by *unconscious* inconsistencies. The presupposition made earlier should also be recalled, that the individual is not attracted to evil but to a good that is real or apparent. Therefore, under these conditions, the second dimension excludes deliberate sin.

The second dimension is not, either, an expression of psychopathology as this is usually described in psychiatric taxonomy. As regards manifest psychopathology, such as the psychoses, neuroses, and serious personality disorders (on these last, see Horton *et al.*) (21), a differentiation can be based on the fact that these mental disturbances limit the person to a social adaptation that is very precarious, something that is not necessarily true for the second dimension.

It is more difficult to make the distinction between the second dimension and forms of psychopathology that are not manifest. Without wishing to offer an exhaustive discussion of this complex problem, one may follow Kubie (22) in stating that the essence of psychopathology lies in the person being driven to repeat an action automatically even when it is inappropriate to the actual circumstances. However, as Lidz (23) has well observed, repetitive ways of reacting and relating occur in all lives.

It is necessary, therefore, to see what are the areas of the personality that are affected by these "automatic repetitions."

And here it seems possible to make a distinction, at least conceptually, between the repetitions linked with psychopathology and those dependent on the second dimension. According to object-relations theory (see for instance Kernberg) (24), one may speak of pathology when the relations that are "automatically repeated" involve a *human* object. In this case, human interpersonal relationships are both the term to which such automatic repetitions are referred, and the criterion of their inappropriateness.

It is different with regard to the second dimension; here, the goal and the term of reference are the objective and transcendent values of Christ (as one lives and grows in these), while human interpersonal relationships are to be interpreted and evaluated in the light of these values (25). Such relationships may be the expression of Christian love (26), but it is also possible for them to be socially "normal" without their being the expression of an authentic love that transcends the needs of the subject in order to live the values of Christ. This explains how a moderate or even good social adaptation can exist along with and in spite of a marked prevalence of inconsistencies over consistencies in the second dimension, and, vice versa, how a good or even saintly Christian life, in the sense of subjective sanctity, can exist with and in spite of the presence of psychopathological symptoms.

### *A conceptual distinction*

It has been stated that it is *possible* to make a *conceptual* distinction between psychopathology and the second dimension. It is thereby implicitly admitted that *in some cases* psychopathology, more or less manifest, accompanies (or determines) a marked prevalence of inconsistencies over consistencies in the second dimension.

One may conclude that the presence of the second dimension is "normal" in man, this second dimension being

different both from sin and from psychopathology. It is clear that this second dimension is not a deterministic force; neither, however, is it something quite indeterminate. For it has influences that are foreseeable. Above all, one may anticipate expectations that are more or less unrealistic regarding both the ideals of the person and the roles in which these might be attained and lived. Thus an opportune discernment is possible that in turn will illuminate the probable choices and probable lines of growth in the values of Christ proper to each person.

Further, one may foresee if the person, in his effort to live the ideals of Christ, enjoys a sufficient liberty to be able to take a suitable distance from the various components of any situation, so that, with a proper detachment, he can give each component its due importance in the context of the whole situation.

It is true that such predictive use of an examination of the second dimension does not permit precise systematic deductions; but predictions can be made in terms of schemes of recurrence that offer a certainty defined by the limits of non-systematic knowledge that is compatible with the laws of statistics (27). And so, a discernment of spirits that aims at being really useful to the person must take account not only of conscious components but also of realities underlying these, realities that have an importance deriving from the mode of being and action of the normal person who proclaims the values of Christ.

### THE PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

"In unity with all fields [e.g. the natural sciences, the human sciences, theology] is...the human mind, which operates in all fields and in radically the same fashion in each" (28). In other words, all such fields involve the same fundamental operations of the mind, in the same fundamental relationships. Therefore, according to Lonergan, one may speak of a *transcendental* method based on an objectification of the operations of the subject that

are necessarily involved in any *specific* method, such as those of the human sciences, of theology, etc. However, such use of the transcendental operations in a specific field requires consideration of the specificity of the operations of the subject related to that field. Here, the attempt will be made to give a more explicit account of the transcendental operations of the subject that have been implicit in the psychological perspective presented above.

The present more explicit application of transcendental method is put under the heading of a "philosophical perspective" only because "transcendental method is coincident with a notable part of what has been considered philosophy, but it is not any philosophy or all philosophy" (29). In this sense, philosophy and psychology constitute a differentiated unity (30).

#### *Four levels of operations*

Lonergan has distinguished four levels of operations that together constitute the process of knowing and deciding. Referring the reader to the original sources (31) for a more detailed discussion of these levels, it will be sufficient here to say that the first three levels are directly operative in the process of *knowing*, while the fourth level becomes more directly operative in the process of *deciding* and *doing*.

To attain knowledge, the subject must use operations on three levels. The first of these is that of experience: such experience is constituted by sensible presentations, imaginative representations, affective and aggressive feelings, etc. When a decision or election is foreseen, then the attractive or repulsive aspects of such experience take on a particular importance.

The second level is that of understanding, which, in the case where a decision is intended, is understood as practical insight: an insight into what is to be done, rather than what is.



The third level is that of critical reflection and judgment; in this context, a judgment of value. While practical insight presents a possible course of action, practical reflection examines critically this course of action with its consequences and motives, as well as possible alternative courses of action with their consequences and motives. Upon such reflection follows the judgment of value, which pronounces the course of action to be truly good or only apparently good, or better or worse than its alternatives.

The fourth level is that of responsibility. This fourth level is implicitly operative in all the preceding operations; it is expressed in a complete and explicit way in the final decision, when one passes from knowing to doing by a deliberate choice and action.

Lonergan maintains (32) that his account of the processes involved in knowing and deciding is invulnerable and not subject to revision.

It is important to note that each successive level, in transcending and completing the preceding level, may also retain and preserve the defects, limitations, or distortions present on preceding levels. It is worth emphasizing the point that this is particularly true when such defects have remained unconscious and have not been recognized; there will then be a tendency for such defects, limitations, or distortions to be preserved and repeated, because frequently they are in the service of unconscious needs, and for this precise reason are very difficult to recognize and correct.

The processes of knowing and deciding described by Lonergan are at the basis of an existential discernment of spirits as anthropologically viewed in the present study. However, the operations of transcendental method, which characterize the spontaneous dynamism of the human mind, are strictly speaking *conscious* operations. In the light of the facts discussed above in the psychological perspective, it seems to me that for an adequate understanding of the existential discernment of spirits (or of human nature itself), it is necessary to take full account of the subconscious component that lies in the second dimension, since this is a normal component of the human psy-

che (33). As to how this is to be done, some brief reflections will now be offered.

### *Two kinds of personal dispositions*

In an existential discernment of spirits, it is necessary to distinguish two kinds of dispositions of the person toward the ideals and values of Christ: the affective and the effective.

The affective disposition involved in the process of discernment influences the first three levels of operations described by Lonergan, especially with regard to the mode in which values are perceived and interpreted in their content and their attractiveness; and also in the readiness or reluctance with which a judgment of value is followed by a decision. The data discussed in the psychological perspective indicate that there can be two components in this affective disposition: that of the first or conscious dimension (with the qualifications made in the psychological perspective) and that of the second dimension, where there exists an interaction between the conscious and the unconscious; and the unconscious may be discordant or inconsistent, or even prevalent, with respect to the conscious.

The effective disposition, which is linked to the election and the assimilation or internalization of the values of Christ, corresponds to the fourth level of operations, in which decision enters: action follows on the first three levels because a decision is taken and carried out by an act of the will. However, regarding the will, it is necessary to distinguish three different aspects, following Lonergan: will as the bare *capacity* to make decisions, willing as the *act* of deciding, and willingness as "the *state* in which persuasion is not needed to bring one to a decision" (34). Now it is clear that such willingness may be more or less reduced or impeded by the influence of the second dimension already present on the first three levels of psychic operations.

In such a case, there follows a limitation on human freedom. The freedom thus limited is not essential free-

dom, but what Lonergan has named "effective freedom" (35). That is to say, there is a limitation on the openness of man to grasping the ideals of Christ by means of understanding, to being motivated by these values in reflection, and to living them out in decisions. In other words, the unconscious may influence all four levels of psychic operations. As was pointed out, this does not affect subjective sanctity, but it does affect objective sanctity, and has an influence on the decision to remain in religious life or leave it; these consequences are influenced by the second dimension with a force that is significantly greater than that of the first dimension.

### *Two conclusions*

Two general conclusions are indicated by the psychological and philosophical perspectives thus far considered: 1) there is an intrinsic connection between the discernment of spirits and the election and assimilation of the values of Christ, that is, a connection that is a consequence of the mode of being and operating of the normal person; and 2) the second dimension can influence the affective disposition toward the values of Christ, and thus also the effective disposition; there follows a possible limitation of effective freedom that affects objective sanctity and the apostolic effectiveness depending on this.

There is a functional link between these two conclusions; indeed, the second dimension is the common denominator that tends to influence the discernment of spirits, the election, and both affective and effective dispositions to the assimilation of the values of Christ, under the two aspects of objective holiness and objective apostolic effectiveness. This functional link lies in the fact that *agere sequitur esse*, that is, the mode of being (in terms of the second dimension) influences the mode of action.

One particular aspect of this link merits a brief elaboration. As noted by Crowe (36), Aristotle and Aquinas had already understood that ideals or values are seen

by each person in a way that corresponds to his own personality: *qualis unusquisque est, talis et finis videtur ei*. The research-findings presented in the psychological perspective are in the same line: the greater the prevalence of inconsistencies over consistencies in an individual, the more unrealistic are his expectations with regard to his own ideals.

The problem thus posed is crucial for an existential discernment of spirits: if the person "creates" his expectations with regard to his values, how is it possible to escape the vicious circle in judging our judgment of the values we choose as good for us? How is it possible to get beyond what is "good for me" or "good for us" and to attain to what is really good, to what transcends our own personality? In an existential discernment of spirits, this problem regards not only the objectivity of our judgments of value but also our liberty and responsibility.

One way of breaking the vicious circle is to pay more serious attention to the second dimension, especially to its component of unconscious inconsistencies, which (as has been seen) distort our judgment of the objective values of Christ and limit our effective freedom in living these: indeed, at least as regards objective sanctity and the apostolic effectiveness that depends on this, it is useful to discern the presence in each one of us of those unconscious inconsistencies and try to free ourselves from them. In other words, it is not enough to present to a person the values of Christ; it is also necessary to help the person to perceive these values with objectivity, and to be sufficiently free to live according to them.

#### THE THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (37)

Theological anthropology aims at reaching an understanding of man by way of revelation. In this task, it has a certain relationship with the empirical human sciences. While theology cannot make a *direct* contribution to the theory, methodology, or material circumstances

of the empirical human sciences, or to the evaluation of the practical utility of these sciences, theology does have an important contribution to make in the correct interpretation of their findings. Conversely, a correct interpretation of revelation presupposes on the part of the interpreter an appropriate knowledge of the object being studied: "the greater the exegete's resources, the greater the likelihood that he will be able to enumerate all possible interpretations and assign to each its proper measure of probability" (38). Whence the possible contribution of the human sciences to the understanding of revelation.

Within the limits of the discussion of discernment already developed, two aspects of human nature will be considered in the light of revelation. These correspond to the two general conclusions emerging from psychological and philosophical considerations: 1) the intrinsic connection of discernment with election and with growth in the values of Christ, and 2) the existence in man of the second dimension, which limits effective liberty as regards objective sanctity and apostolic effectiveness.

As was seen in the psychological and philosophical perspectives, the second dimension influences all of the activities named in these two conclusions: discernment, election, affective and effective dispositions to growth in the values of Christ understood as objective sanctity and apostolic effectiveness; that is, these activities depend to a significant extent on the existence of the second dimension: *agere sequitur esse*. Thus, these two conclusions have a certain functional unity. Is there in biblical revelation some foundation for this functional anthropological unity in Christian living? This is the point to be considered now, treating the two conclusions separately.

### *Regarding the first aspect*

The basic text for a discussion of the first aspect seems to be Rom 12:2: "Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that you

may discern what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect" (39).

Without wishing to enter into fine details of exegesis (for these see, for instance, Therrien, Käsemann, and Schlier), (40) three moments can be considered in this text. In the background is a moment of justification, since the text speaks of man as redeemed, renewed and in the process of renewal; and this moment has its foundation in the preceding eleven chapters of the epistle. Two other moments are immediately involved: one of a "mental" attitude of judgment and discernment, which in turn prepares for a moment of choice and decision in favor of what is good, acceptable to God, and perfect.

The text treats of a spiritual renewal and therefore of a *spiritual* discernment of what is good, acceptable to God, and perfect. This is noted by many commentators (Wohlenberg, Bornemann, Rossano, Schlier (41), etc.), who find several points of correspondence in this sense between Rom 12:2 and Eph 5:8-10 as well as 1 Thess 5:19-22. In the same line is the fact that discernment is of a good (*agathon*) that is transcendent, objective, and revealed (cf the numerous authors cited by Therrien).

In the two moments directly involved in the text, three terms merit a brief comment in this study: *metamorphousthe*, *nous* and *teleion*.

Metamorphosis or transformation is to be understood in the sense of "let yourselves be transformed"; in this, however, the primary action of the Spirit is united with the active participation of man (Behm, Michel, Schlier, Schrage) (42). This transformation is a work that lasts throughout life, and it is love (*agape*) that stimulates the acquisition of knowledge and the refinement of feeling that permits a discernment of the good (Phil 1:9-11).

While it may be said, with the support of many authors, that this transformation involves the whole man, St. Paul indicates one precise aspect of this renewal, that of the *nous*. Schlier offers an exegetical analysis of this word as used by Paul, in general and in this particular context, and reaches the following conclusion: "*Nous*, then, means 'thinking' or 'judgment', but with the collateral meaning of an operative or indeed existential think-

ing, which is the premise for a critical decision" (43). Käsemann's comments are to the same effect (44). Here the parallel with existential discernment involving the first three levels of Lonergan as a premise to the fourth level, that of decision, seems notable.

The third important term is *teleion*: the discernment of what is "perfect". Therrien cites many passages from Paul and many commentators to conclude that *teleion* "in general expresses an idea of totality, integrity, excellence, *non-division*" (45). This offers a parallel with the idea of non-contradiction as involved in the inconsistencies discussed in the psychological perspective. This parallel is all the more plausible since the same word (*teleion*) is used in 1 Cor 14:20 to contrast the judgment of the mature adult with that of the child (cf also Heb 5:11-14). After all, as modern psychology has shown, the child lives on to a greater or lesser extent in every adult.

Taken together, the scriptural tests discussed seem to offer a good foundation for the anthropological thesis that discernment is intrinsically connected with election and with the assimilation of the values of Christ. They also indicate that the mode of being of a person (also in the sense of the inconsistencies of the second dimension) influences his mode of acting as a Christian.

### *Regarding the second aspect*

The second aspect of theological anthropology to be considered comprises these three affirmations: 1) there is in each individual, although to varying degrees, an interior struggle that is expressed as inconsistencies between what he would wish to be and to do habitually (the ideal self) and what he is and habitually does (the actual self); these inconsistencies are part of the second dimension as described in the psychological perspective; 2) these inconsistencies limit the effective liberty of the person; and 3) this limitation does not affect subjective sanctity, but it does affect objective sanctity and apostolic effectiveness depending on this.

The scriptural text to be examined is Gal 5:16-17: "But I say, walk by the Spirit, and you will not gratify the desires of the flesh. For the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires of the Spirit are against the flesh: these are opposed to each other, so that you do not do what you would" (46).

Brief exegetical comment will be made in the light of the stages of the history of salvation discussed by Lyonnet in important publications (47), which may be consulted for a more complete documentation regarding also the views of many other commentators.

According to Lyonnet (48), in chapters 7 and 8 of Romans three stages are described by Paul: first, the stage of paradise, in which Adam and Eve lived in friendship with God, not under the law but under grace; second, the stage from the first sin until Christ, that of man who is fallen (*lapsus*) and sold to sin; third, the stage of man who is redeemed by Christ (*lapsus et redemptus*), man who is liberated from the law of sin and has received the gift of the Spirit.

Gal 5:16-17 does not deal with a situation specific to the Galatians, but treats a problem of general validity regarding life in the Spirit (49). Further, it deals with man as fallen and redeemed, in the third stage of the history of salvation in Lyonnet's terms. However, as is amply documented by Lyonnet, this was not the interpretation of commentators such as Augustine (starting with the Pelagian controversy), Aquinas and Luther, an interpretation that has affected both exegesis and theology up to almost the present time, among Catholics and especially among Protestants.

The inexact interpretation of Augustine, which influenced subsequent commentators, involved two points that concern us here: Rom 7:14-25 and Gal 5:16-17 are considered as perfect parallels, and both are explained in terms of man as sinner (the second stage) before the Pelagian controversy, and in terms of the just man (third stage) during the Pelagian controversy.

In reality, there is a substantial difference between these two passages: in both Paul says that there is a struggle within man; but in Rom 7 this is described as a



struggle of the flesh against the superior part of man, reason or *nous*; while Gal 5:17 describes a struggle of the flesh (understood as a motivating force (50) or as a concrete existential force) (51) against the Spirit, the *pneuma*. Rom 7:14-25 deals with man as fallen and sinful, in the second stage (52), while Gal 5:17 deals with man as fallen and redeemed, whose justification has begun, in the third stage of the history of salvation (53).

### *Man is interiorly divided*

Man in the third stage, the just man animated by the Spirit, is by definition victorious (Gal 5:16), obviously not in virtue of what he is by himself, but as "able to do all things in him who strengthens" (Phil 4:13). However, there still remains an interior struggle, an interior division on account of which "you do not do what you would" (Gal 5:17). It seems therefore that man as *lapsus et redemptus* still contains a discrepancy or inconsistency between his ideal self and his actual self, between what he habitually is or does and what he wants to be or do. After all, this is implicitly confirmed by Vatican Council II: "For in man himself many elements wrestle with one another ... Hence he suffers from internal divisions, and from these flow so many and such great discords in society" (54). It seems realistic, therefore, to conclude that some inconsistencies are present in all men.

The anthropology presented in Gal 5:17 also concerns liberty. Even though he is animated by the Spirit, man has a limitation on his effective freedom; his liberty is imperfect (55). Schlier makes the same affirmation in discussing the meaning (final or consecutive) of the conjunction *hina* of Gal 5:17b: "the opposition of Spirit and flesh emerging in their contrary desires tends to hinder the will of man, stimulated now by the exigencies of the flesh, now by the exigencies of the Spirit, and to impede its implementation" (56).

A few more brief exegetical observations will help to define further the nature of this limitation on effective liberty and of inconsistencies.

In the first place, the Greek verb for willing ("so that you do not do what you *would*") in Gal 5:17b is *thelein* and not *boulesthai*; it expresses an inclination of the will rather than a decision of the will (57). Further, the conditional structure of the expression *ha ean thelete* emphasizes a dynamic tendency of the will rather than a conclusion reached. Therefore what is in question is an aspiration rather than a decision.

In the second place, as a consequence of the interior struggle between Spirit and flesh, there are in man expressions of inconsistencies on account of which he does not do what he aspires to consciously, or - in part - because of underlying subconscious motives (58). These inconsistencies may be understood in two senses, which can coexist: that of not doing the evil that is desired, or that of not doing the good to which one aspires; this is partly similar to the comment of Mussner (59). In the second of these senses, the inconsistencies described in Gal 5:17 may include those of the second dimension, which - as discussed in the psychological perspective - are characterized by the action of unconscious motives.

Hence, such inconsistencies are neither sin nor pathology, but are perhaps one of the expressions of the concupiscence that, according to the Council of Trent, has been *relicta ad agonem*, left for an interior struggle; still, as has been seen, they can affect objective sanctity and apostolic effectiveness, particularly on account of their unconscious force.

From this brief historical-exegetical analysis of Gal 5:16-17, several points emerge that corroborate the three anthropological affirmations whose verification was desired.

Together, the Pauline texts examined indicate the functional unity that exists between being and living for Christ also when the second dimension is taken as a common denominator. As shown in the psychological and philosophical perspectives, this functional unity in Christian progress seems to exist not only for the conscious dimension, but also for the unconscious; that is, the unconscious existence of the second dimension also has an influence, and to a notable degree, on Christian action and progress.

The three perspectives, psychological, philosophical, and theological, thus seem to converge toward a single vision of man.

## CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The discussion has led to the presentation of some basic elements toward a Christian anthropology. The consequences, theoretical and practical, that might be drawn are numerous. Here only a few of these can be indicated, in the hope of offering further elaboration in possible future publications.

What is the relationship between the psychic life of man and the spiritual life understood as subjective sanctity, objective sanctity, and apostolic effectiveness? This question is frequently met with two answers that are opposed in the extreme. One is that there is no connection whatsoever: man is completely free, and therefore a lack of spiritual growth is due to a lack of responsiveness to divine grace, that is, to sin. The other is that there is a strict and almost total relationship, so that man is almost without freedom, and therefore a lack of spiritual growth is due to psychopathology.

This study has taken an intermediate position: in terms of the second dimension, which is neither sin nor pathology; which does not imply the almost total presence or absence of freedom, but of different degrees of effective freedom, which affect the objective aspect of sanctity and apostolic effectiveness. Further, this second dimension is present in everyone, although in different degrees and forms. Finally, while it is neither sin nor pathology, it has a significant influence on objective sanctity and apostolic effectiveness.

Is this something new? No. On this point it would be enough to cite, among many other possible sources, the scriptural texts that have been discussed and that offer some foundation for the affirmations made.

*The second dimension must not be lost sight of*

Perhaps the contribution of the present study lies above all in the suggestion that it is not possible to understand what man is, what *every* man is, without taking more serious account than has hitherto been customary of the second dimension. There are so many instances of human behavior that can be neither explained nor remedied by thinking or operating *solely* in terms of rationality, ideals, spiritual limitations, or psychopathological deficiencies.

A few examples of such behavior may be indicated. Many things have been done in the name of Vatican Council II that are in accord with neither the letter nor the spirit of the Council. Many people have abandoned priestly or religious vocations, including some who had held high responsibilities of spiritual leadership. The "growing pains" suffered by many religious communities do not seem to have been always accompanied by real growth. To grant greater liberty and initiative to people is a good pedagogical norm; but it is not by itself sufficient because it does not confer freedom miraculously; the second dimension persists in the person, and so do its effects.

Indeed, as indicated by the research referred to in this article, the second dimension is an important factor contributing to such happenings. Therefore, a discernment of spirits that really aims at helping people must be able to take account of this dimension and discover it, in particular the unconscious inconsistencies involved. To this purpose, some practical rules may be suggested; it is hoped to do that in a further publication. In any case, it is clear that the contribution of the human sciences to spiritual direction is not something marginal or secondary.

Above all, since the unconscious is, by definition, not accessible to the awareness of the person without appropriate assistance, it is important to offer this assistance. It is not enough to present to people the values of Christ. They must also be helped to an objective perception of these values and to a liberty that makes it

possible to live according to them. To these purposes, as has been seen, the human sciences, if understood and applied in a *Christian* way, can make a contribution; and this contribution affects the psychic operations intrinsic to man and to his growth, including spiritual growth.

Here lies the positive and pedagogical aspect of the contribution of the human sciences: in teaching and in promoting growth toward the good, rather than in curing deformations. This implies no detraction from the usefulness of "spiritual direction"; it is not a matter of detracting, but of completing the task of making the growth of the person more profound and more stable. Is there any reason for rejecting such further help? Does not a well-ordered charity require that whatever helps most be actually offered?

In the second place, the contribution of the human sciences is necessary because all men are subject to bias. As Lonergan points out, such bias may take four forms (60): individual egoism; the egoism of the group, which is stronger and blinder; the general bias of common sense, when it thinks of itself as all-sufficient; and finally, the dramatic bias that is revealed by depth-psychology. As seen from research-findings, unconscious inconsistencies tend to create false expectations with respect to roles and values.

And it is here that discernment as discussed in this study becomes necessary. For discernment must be concerned not only with the presence of divine grace, but also with the appropriateness of the individual's response, and with the objectivity and freedom of the response; thus, in discerning it is necessary to perceive to what degree the unconscious may render the response to grace an apparent rather than a real good. An anthropological-psychological discernment does not touch the aspect of the presence of grace, that is, of subjective sanctity; but it is directly relevant in promoting an appropriate response to grace in objective sanctity and apostolic effectiveness; this response is observable, and depth-psychology is highly useful in this observation.

*Implications for community discernment*

This usefulness and necessity of anthropological discernment on an individual level holds also for community discernment: for community discernment can be neither understood nor implemented in an appropriate and really constructive way unless individual discernment has first been understood and performed. In the words of Lonergan: "Common sense is subject to a threefold bias. Accordingly, we can expect that individual decisions will be likely to suffer from individual bias, that common decisions will be likely to suffer from the various types of group bias, and that all decisions will be likely to suffer from general bias" (61). There will follow conflicts between the individual and the group. But, more than from such open conflicts, difficulties will arise from another and underlying opposition "that general bias sets up between the decisions that intelligence and reasonableness would demand and the actual decisions, individual and common, that are made. For this opposition is both profound and unnoticed" (62).

The interested reader may find other acute and pertinent observations of Lonergan in the same place. One further point must suffice here: "More or less automatically and unconsciously, each successive batch of possible and practical courses of action is screened to eliminate as unpractical whatever does not seem practical to an intelligence and a willingness that not only are developed imperfectly but also suffer from bias" (63).

No one will deny the value of fraternal union or of community discernment, *given* the necessary anthropological presuppositions. But this is a condition that is neither easily nor frequently fulfilled, since there is normally present an unconscious component that makes difficult the improvement of this anthropological basis, in spite of the contribution of the community. Recent research goes to confirm this (64).

The considerations and data presented in this article are transcultural and *trans-situational*. It is true that profound cultural differences exist, as between the Eastern and Western worlds. But these differences do not concern the fundamental psychic operations that are at the basis

of the present study. This holds for the transcendental method proposed by Lonergan, as he himself shows (65). The same may be said for the structural approach on which the theory and results presented in the psychological perspective are based.

Whatever be the differences in psychic contents, defenses, or emotions that exist between an Oriental and an Occidental, it still remains true that an inconsistency or a consistency, within a given individual, between what he is and what he wishes to be, is always an instance of non-contradiction or of contradiction. When it is a matter of contradiction, there will be an opposition of forces within the person that reduce liberty, and reduce the capacity for self-transcendence, self-direction, and self-control; especially if some of these forces are unconscious. For such opposition affects all four levels distinguished by transcendental method, including the level of decision, which, in its turn, grounds an appropriate functioning of the first three levels.

From the foregoing, other consequences may also be drawn. Following Lonergan, it can be said that two notions vanish: "the notion of pure intellect or pure reason that operates on its own without guidance or control from responsible decision; and the notion of will as an arbitrary power indifferently choosing between good and evil" (66).

One hears more and more of a new anthropological orientation in theology. The areas of depth-psychology discussed in this study can make a modest but useful contribution in this new effort. At least, they permit us to confront and face existential problems not with fatalism or the pessimism of the stoic; nor with an attitude of infantile idealism that would deny reality; nor in the expectation of a miraculous advent of magic, facile, and rapid solutions; but with the realism that Ignatius implicitly suggests in proposing the discernment of spirits: accepting that man is a vulnerable being, and acting as if everything depended on us, while remembering that everything depends on the gratuitous love of God.

# NOTES

1. Gaston Fessard, in *La Dialectique des Exercices Spirituels de saint Ignace de Loyola*, 2 vol., Paris, 1956, 1966, following the Hegelian analysis of the *free act*, proposes an interpretation of the Exercises that centers on the elaboration of a free decision. This is the extended sense he gives to Ignatian election, the culminating point of the Exercises. Gilles Cusson, in *Pédagogie de l'expérience spirituelle: Bible et Exercices*, Paris-Bruges, 1968, elaborates, on the other hand, an itinerary of Christian experience whose precise stages are marked out by the Exercises and that are assured, both subjectively and objectively, by the inner dynamism of the Exercises.
2. Charles A. Bernard, *Eléments pour un directoire des Exercices*, CIS, Rome, 1978.
3. *Ibid.*, 19.
4. A. Chollet, "Discernment des esprits," in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* IV.1 1375-1415; J. Pégon, "Discernement des esprits: période moderne," in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique* III, 1266-1281; Karl Rahner, *The Dynamic Element in the Church*, London, 1964; Harvey D. Egan, *The Spiritual Exercises and the Ignatian Mystical Horizon*, St. Louis, 1976.
5. Wohlenberg, Bornemann, Grundmann, Schlier, Rossano: for details see Therrien, as in following note.
6. G. Therrien, *Le Discernement dans les écrits pauliniens*, Paris, 75-76.
7. For a discussion applied to the area of moral theology, see Bartholomew Kiely, *Psychology and Moral Theology: Some Lines of Convergence*, doctoral dissertation, PUG, in preparation.
8. Karl Rahner, "Theological Anthropology," in *Sacramentum mundi*, London, 1963, vol. 3, 365-370; Idem, "Anthropozentrik," in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*,



- I, 631-634; Idem, "A Scheme for a Treatise of Dogmatic Theology," in *Theological Investigations* I, London-New York, 1974, 20-37; Maurizio Flick, Zoltan Alszeghy, *Fondamenti di una antropologia cristiana*, Florence, 1969; Flick-Alszeghy, "Antropologia," in *Nuovo Dizionario di Teologia*, ed. G. Barbaglio, S. Dianich, Ed. Paoline, 1977, 12-29; Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Sponsa Verbi*, Brescia, 1970; Idem, *Dieu et l'homme aujourd'hui*, Paris, 1966.
9. Michael J. Buckley, "The Structure of the Rules for the Discernment of Spirits," in *The Way*, Supplement 20, 1973.
  10. Spiritual Exercises, 330.
  11. *Ibid.*, 336.
  12. Louis Beinaert, "Discernement et psychisme," in *Christus* 4 [1954], 50-61; William W. Meissner, "Psychological Notes on the Spiritual Exercises," in *Woodstock Letters* 93 [1964], 165-191; also the research presented by L.M. Rulla, J. Ridick, F. Imoda, *Entering and Leaving Vocation: Intrapsychic Dynamics*, Rome-Chicago, 1976.
  13. Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, London, 1958, epilogue.
  14. Karl Rahner, *The Dynamic Element in the Church*, London, 1964; Idem, "Reflections on the Experience of Grace," in *Theological Investigations* III, New York-London, 1974, 86-90.
  15. Avery Dulles, "Finding God's Will. Rahner's Interpretation of the Ignatian Election," in *Woodstock Letters* 94 [1965], 139-152.
  16. Harvey D. Egan, *op. cit.* in note 4 above.
  17. The reader may find a discussion of the theories of Rogers, Maslow, Allport, Jung, and other authors, together with an extensive bibliography, in the following two works: C.S. Hall, G. Lindzey, *Theories of Personality*, New York-London-Sydney-Toronto, 1970; S.R. Maddi, *Personality Theories: A Comparative Analysis*, Homewood, Illinois, 1976.

18. V. Frankl, *The Doctor and the Soul*, New York, 1960; Idem, *Psychotherapy and Existentialism: Selected Papers on Logotherapy*, New York, 1967; Idem, *The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy*, New York-Cleveland, 1969.
19. L.M. Rulla, *Depth Psychology and Vocation*, Rome-Chicago, 1971.
20. L.M. Rulla, J. Ridick, F. Imoda, *Entering and Leaving Vocation: Intrapsychic Dynamics*, Rome-Chicago, 1976; Rulla, Imoda, Ridick, *Structure psychologique et vocation*, Luxembourg-Bruxelles-Rome, 1978.
21. P.C. Horton, J.W. Louy, H.P. Coppolillo, "Personality Disorder and Transitional Relatedness," in *Archives of General Psychiatry* 30 [1974], 618-622.
22. L.S. Kubie, "The Neurotic Process as the Focus of Physiological and Psychoanalytic Research," in *Journal of Mental Science* 104 [1958], 518-536.
23. T. Lidz, *The Person: His Development throughout the Life Cycle*, New York, 1968, 510.
24. O.F. Kernberg, *Object-Relations Theory and Clinical Psychoanalysis*, New York, 1976.
25. *Structure psychologique et vocation*, as in note 20 above.
26. Karl Rahner, "Reflections on the Unity of the Love of Neighbor and the Love of God," in *Theological Investigations* VI, London, 1974, 231-249.
27. *Insight*, chapters 3 and 4.
28. *Method in Theology*, New York, 1973, 24.
29. *Ibid.*, 25.
30. Kiely has pointed out that Lonergan's approach to transcendental method is a particularly apt instrument for interdisciplinary work involving psychology and philosophy or theology (*op. cit.* in note 7, chapters 1 and 3).
31. *Method in Theology*, esp. chapter 1; *Insight*, esp. 271-278 and 608-616; see also F.E. Crowe, "An Exploration of Lonergan's New Notion of Value," in *Science et esprit* 29 [1977], 123-143.

32. *Insight*, 335-336; *Method in Theology*, 17-19.
33. Lonergan has discussed the influence of the unconscious (*Insight*, 191-202; *Method in Theology*, 34), but he appears to underestimate the pervasiveness of its influence and the tenacity with which it resists change.
34. *Insight*, 623.
35. *Ibid.*, 619-624; 629-693.
36. F.E. Crowe, *op. cit.* in note 31.
37. The author wishes to thank Father Ugo Vanni, S.J., for his helpful comments on this section.
38. *Method in Theology*, 156.
39. Revised Standard Version, Catholic edition, with "discern" substituted for "prove," following Stanislas Lyonnet, *Les Epîtres de saint Paul aux Galates, aux Romains*, Paris, 1966.
40. Therrien, *op. cit.* in note 6, 139-148; H. Schlier, *Der Römerbrief*, Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 1977, 358-362; E. Käsemann, *An die Römer*, Tübingen, 1973, 310-316.
41. For details, see Therrien, 76.
42. For details, see Therrien, 143.
43. Schlier, *Römerbrief*, 361.
44. Käsemann, *An die Römer*, 315-316.
45. Therrien, 148 (note), with emphasis added.
46. Revised Standard Version, Catholic edition, with modifications following Lyonnet, *op. cit.* in note 39.
47. Lyonnet, *Les Epîtres ...*, Paris, 1966; Idem, *Les Etapes du mystère du salut selon l'Épître aux Romains*, Paris, 1969.
48. Lyonnet, *Les Etapes...*, esp. 113-186.
49. Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater*, Göttingen, 1962, 247-250. F. Mussner, *Der Galaterbrief*, Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 1974-374.
50. Mussner, *Der Galaterbrief*, 375-376.
51. Schlier, *Der Brief and die Galater*, 249.

52. Schlier, *Römerbrief*, 228-235; Käsemann, *An die Römer*, 188-203; Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater*, 249.
53. Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater*, 247-250; Mussner, *Der Galaterbrief*, 374-378.
54. *Gaudium et Spes*, 10.
55. Schlier, Mussner, as in note 53; also Lyonnet, as in note 39, p. 40, note; also p. 65.
56. Schlier, *Der Galaterbrief*, 249.
57. Cf Lyonnet, *Les Etapes...*, 147.
58. See explanation given above in the psychological perspective.
59. Mussner, *Der Galaterbrief*, 377.
60. *Insight*, 191-242; *Method in Theology*, 53, 217, 240, 270.
61. *Insight*, 628.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*
64. M.A. Lieberman, I.D. Yalom, M.B. Miles, *Encounter Groups: First Facts*, New York, 1973; Rulla et al., *Entering and Leaving Vocation*; P.B. Smith, "Social Influence Processes and the Outcome of Sensitivity Training," in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 6 [1976], 1087-1094.
65. *Insight*, 736.
66. *Method in Theology*, 121.

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## JUSTICE AND THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES

John J. Carroll

I should like to start with an illustration that I sometimes use at the Gregorian.

### 1. A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF MAN

If a man from another planet, arrived via an UFO, were to observe one of our classes in session, it would quickly become evident to him that he was watching some sort of structured behavior. He would note that an apparently disorganized group of individuals, engaged in lively conversation among themselves, became silent and arranged themselves in orderly rows when a particular individual entered the room. This other individual took a place in front, facing the others, and at some sort of signal from him the others sat down; the individual in front began to speak, while the others opened notebooks and began to write. At a certain point, the speaker became silent and the others, one by one and only after some indication of recognition by the speaker, directed questions to him.

If our observer were to come back a week later, he would find pretty much the same performance repeated; and he would perhaps begin to wonder about the reasons why this behavior is so clearly patterned and hence predictable. A bit of research would probably reveal two inter-related reasons:

- First, there exists in the group a set of *rules* of behavior, formal or informal, spoken or unspoken, but pretty much understood by all: rules about being in the classroom by a certain time; about not interrupting the speaker without his permission; about not speaking while

another is speaking. There are rules also that control the speaker's behavior: he too should be there on time, and prepared; he should speak clearly and not too rapidly, and show no favoritism for particular students; he should be just in giving grades. The rules are not only understood in more or less the same way by all; there also exist mechanisms for enforcement in case of violations, ranging from expressions of disapproval on the part of the others up to possible exclusion from the group or expulsion from the university. However, these mechanisms are rarely called upon; and here we come upon the second reason why classroom behavior is patterned and predictable.

- All of the participants share a more or less common interpretation of the situation in which they find themselves, and this interpretation serves as an *inner guide* to their behavior, justifying and legitimating the external rules. They have come together in order that a certain body of knowledge may be communicated from professor to student, and perhaps also that it may be questioned and challenged a bit. The rules are seen as ensuring the kind of behavior that will facilitate this process. Moreover, in the course of many years of schooling, the participants have formed more or less common conceptions of what it is to be a "good professor" and a "good student," and these ideals have been somehow incorporated into their personalities as morally binding, to the extent that an individual would feel guilty and ashamed if he deviated from the appropriate ideal in an important way.

Thus, not only is man in society and subject to the weight of its rules and sanctions; but society is in man, guiding his interpretations of situations and his valuations of possible types of behavior. Moreover, when we move beyond the rather trivial example that I have used, and note the tremendous variety of interpretations of reality found in different societies and groups around the world: Christian and Buddhist and Hindu, Muslim, Confucian, Marxist, Maoist and Capitalist, and all the subdivisions of each, one realizes to what a massive extent society influences our perceptions and valuations. From the primitive chaos of sense-impressions that impinge upon the perceptive apparatus of a baby, society teaches it to select some and ignore others, and to organize those it has selected into a meaningful cosmos by means of a conceptual framework that goes

far beyond the limits of the sense-impressions themselves. Thus the little "barbarian," born without language or culture, gradually becomes a functioning member of the group by incorporating within himself its values, beliefs, models of behavior and expectations with regard to the behavior of others. He becomes acculturated, in other words.

These considerations may have implications for discussions of the missionary enterprise and inculturation, even for reflections on novitiates and other institutions whose function is to communicate a new subculture. But for our purposes, the important thing to note is that the culture gives meaning to the life of the group, while the group, by living that meaning and incorporating it into its institutions, gives plausibility or credibility to the culture (1).

*Some have more power in society than others*

Nor should we imagine that all members of a society or group are equally influential in the creation, acceptance and transmission of cultural values and interpretations. It seems quite likely that in a modern industrial society, for example, groups such as journalists and novelists and those who control the mass media, educators and clergymen and politicians, and the wealthy and powerful generally, will have an influence disproportionate to their numbers, and that the prevailing values and interpretations of reality will reflect their points of view, or even their economic and political interests. In this case we may speak of an ideology, in the sense in which the term is employed by Berger and Luckmann: "When a particular definition of reality comes to be attached to a concrete power interest, it may be called an ideology" (2).

Perhaps this point can be made more concretely by reviewing some of the interpretations of reality whereby the prerogatives of a new managerial class were justified in various industrial settings.

During and after the Industrial Revolution in England - a period in which "it took 25 years of legislative delibe-

ration to restrict children of nine to a 69-hour week, and that only in the cotton mills" (3) - appeal was made to the employer's supposedly paternal care for his workers, who in return owed him loyalty and obedience; to "Divine Providence," which allotted to each man his place, and against which it would be sinful to rebel; to the claim that poverty is due to vice and that the poor must be disciplined by hard work and the fear of starvation; to a law of nature that made it impossible for the employer to improve the condition of his workers; and finally to the virtue of self-reliance whereby the worker was expected to look out for his own interests.

- The Horatio Alger myth, which presented the United States as a land of opportunity where success came to those who earned it by hard work and self-discipline, served the same purpose for the Rockefellers and Mellons of America.

- And the theory that the workers are the real owners of the factories in Communist East Germany and that no conflict of interest is therefore possible between labor and management served for a time to justify the position of the latter (and of the party that stood behind the managers), until from the evident contradiction between ideology and reality there erupted the violent factory strikes of 1953.

We need not assume that in each case the managerial ideology was deliberately created in order to sustain the interests of an élite. I would rather suspect that, by a process of natural selection, ideas that tend to legitimate the *status quo* will be more acceptable to a society's opinion leaders than those that would subvert it, and so will be more actively promoted.

## 2. A LOOK AT TODAY'S WORLD

If we take a close look around us, in this last quarter of the 20th century, I believe we shall find that the foregoing rather abstract sociological reflections do have some relevance after all, and that ours is a world of massive injustice that is both *structured* and *legitimated*.



But we must look closely, lest the legitimating interpretations obscure our view of the reality.

In his 1973 Address to the Board of Governors, Robert S. McNamara, president of the World Bank Group, discussed the concept of absolute poverty. Speaking of the developing countries, he said:

"One-third to one-half of the two billion human beings in those countries suffer from hunger or malnutrition.

- 20% to 25% of their children die before their fifth birthdays. And millions of those who do not die lead impeded lives because their brains have been damaged, their bodies stunted, and their vitality sapped by nutritional deficiencies.
- The life expectancy of the average person is 20 years less than in the affluent world. They are denied 30% of the lives those of us from the developed nations enjoy. In effect, they are condemned at birth to an early death.
- 800 million of them are illiterate and, despite the continuing expansion of education in the years ahead, even more of their children are likely to be so.

This is absolute poverty: a condition of life so limited as to prevent realization of the potential of the genes with which one is born; a condition of life so degrading as to insult human dignity; and yet a condition of life so common as to be the lot of some 40% of the peoples of the developing countries" (4).

Later in the same address, McNamara insisted that this condition had persisted "despite a decade of unprecedented increase in the gross national product of the developing countries," and was attributable in large part to the highly unequal distribution of incomes within those countries. Thus, "the data suggest that the decade of rapid growth has been accompanied by greater maldistribution of income in many developing countries, and that the problem is most severe in the countryside. There has been an increase in the output of mining, industry and government, and in the incomes of the people dependent on these

sectors; but the productivity and income of the small farmer have stagnated. One can conclude that policies aimed primarily at accelerating economic growth have, in most developing countries, benefited mainly the upper 40% of the population and that the allocation of public services and investment funds has tended to strengthen rather than offset this trend" (5).

What McNamara was saying, back in 1973, was that we not only live in a world of poverty that is severe enough to be a blight on human lives and destructive of human potential; it is also a world of inequality, in which those nations and groups within nations that are already comparatively well off receive far more than their proportionate share of the benefits of economic growth. If we add the principle of Catholic social doctrine that the goods of the earth were created in order that all men might live lives worthy of human beings, it seems we must conclude that it is also a world of massive injustice. Moreover, McNamara suggests that this inequality of participation in the fruits of growth has resulted precisely from government policies regarding economic development, public services, and investment. Thus it is a *structured* injustice that has been incorporated into the operating procedures of national and perhaps international bodies, becoming part of the "rules of the game."

A good bit of evidence in support of McNamara's analysis has accumulated in the past five years, and many details have been added. The International Labor Organization, for example, conducted a study in seven Asian countries that together account for about 70% of the population in the non-socialist Third World (6). It found economic growth to have been accompanied not only by greater inequality of income, but by an absolute decline in the real income of the poorer segments of the rural population, a consequence of the concentration of land-ownership, credit and marketing facilities, and educational opportunities in the hands of the wealthier segments.

One fairly common situation may serve here as an example: Interest rates on bank loans are kept artificially low, presumably to help the small businessman and farmer who is in need of credit. But credit is in short supply, and preference is given to the large farmer or indus-

trialist who has more collateral and is a better credit risk. The result is that the wealthy, having access to credit at less than its real value, are encouraged to borrow as much as possible and to invest in labor-saving machinery, thus aggravating an already serious unemployment problem. Meanwhile the poor farmer and businessman must do without credit, or else obtain it at exorbitant rates from the local loan-shark.

*Confidence mechanisms only seem to 'legitimate'*

In many developing nations, the tax structures place a proportionately heavier burden on the poor than on the wealthy while the planning and administering of housing programs, health, educational and social services consistently favor the urban elite rather than the rural poor, as Charles Elliot has shown in considerable detail (7). But here I want to move on to a further point, which is central to Elliott's analysis: that the injustice is not only massive and structured, but also legitimated by "confidence mechanisms," which make it *seem* beneficial to the poor.

The highly sophisticated cardiac center, for example, which absorbs more than 50% of the annual budget of the Ministry of Health in a country where most people never see a doctor in their lives and where the greatest health need of the general population may be clean drinking water and environmental sanitation, is a case in point. The cardiac center, like the low interest, can be presented as benefiting "the people," but in fact it is an extremely expensive service to the small, urban, relatively well-to-do segment that suffers from heart disease and is in a position to make use of its facilities. The cost is paid by the rural poor, who must continue to suffer from intestinal parasites and gastroenteritis.

Aside from such "confidence mechanisms," economic and social inequalities are legitimated by appeals to the values of freedom, anticommunism, economic development and the hope that some of the wealth will eventually trickle down to the needs and will of the people, of which those in

power are the authentic interpreters, and lately to an elaborate ideology of national security.

There is reason to believe, however, that these legitimations have about the same validity as the earlier appeals to Divine Providence. Of the argument that inequality is necessary for economic development, McNamara has this to say: "But on the whole, the middle-income developing countries have greater distortions in their income distribution patterns than any growth theory could possibly justify" (8). And the argument from the "people's will" seems to be belied by the rapid spread of military regimes in the developing countries, with all the apparatus of rigged elections, secret police, suppressed labor and peasant organizations, political prisoners, torture and mysterious disappearances. Thus, when the "inner guide" fails to assure the desired behavior, recourse is had to external pressures and sanctions.

Our discussion thus far has focused on the developing countries, and mainly on those that are not under Communist control; for those that are under such control the analysis would be somewhat different, but the conclusions would probably be quite similar. And those of us who are from the developed nations should not assume too easily that these problems do not concern us. A publication of the U.S. Catholic Conference raises some important questions about how the costs and benefits of American prosperity have been distributed (9). And the further question can be raised, as it is being raised: to what extent are the governments and peoples of the developed nations, and the multinational corporations operating out of them, responsible, through their economic policies and their alliances with Third World elites, for some of the injustice which we have noted? Can they justify a standard of living that, projected on a world scale, would mean global disaster?

### 3. THE ROLES OF RELIGION

Thus far we have seen that human behavior in society is structured by explicit or implicit rules, and that the

rules themselves are often justified and legitimated by a common understanding of the situation in which the group finds itself. And we have claimed that many of the structures of social and economic life in our world are in fact unjust, yet legitimated by specious interpretations or self-serving ideologies. I should like to go on now and look at the functions of religion in this process. And I emphasize the plural here, for I want to insist that religion can both a) serve as an integrating force in society, conferring ultimate legitimacy of the group's norms and interpretations of reality, and b) perform a prophetic role, criticizing those norms and interpretations on the basis of its own transcendent values.

Many authors have pointed out that religion can link social life to some vision of ultimate reality, or of God, thus giving a supernatural validity to the group's norms and self-understanding: one thinks of the Jews and other "Chosen People" down through history; of the way in which their Catholic faith and nationalism have together sustained the Polish people down through the generations and particularly in these last thirty years of Communist rule; of the way in which most nations, in time of war or other national emergency, tend to link their cause with God's and their national symbols with the most meaningful available religious symbols. This last point is important, for rite and symbol engage man at a level deeper than that of reason and argumentation (10).

The facts seem to be clear: how one evaluates them may well depend on his judgment with regard to the particular society or institution that receives the benefit of religious legitimation. Marx's famous dictum that religion is the opium of the people differs from the more neutral observation that religion is an integrating force in society mainly in the negative moral valuation that Marx assigns to integration in what he sees as an unjust and exploitative society.

And there is evidence that would seem to give credibility to Marx's judgment. On the slavery issue in the United States, the Protestant Churches split into mutually hostile factions while the Catholic bishops, in the face of rising anti-Catholicism, maintained a prudent silence; the Jesuits themselves were slaveholders until 1838, when;

to meet some financial obligations, they sold their slaves to Catholic slaveholders in Louisiana and Georgia (11). During an outbreak of labor strife in the 1870's, when, despite rapid economic development in the United States, real wages decreased by 25% within a decade, a renowned Protestant preacher and writer thus denounced the strikers:

"It is said that a dollar a day is not enough for a wife and five or six children. No, not if the man smokes or drinks beer. It is not enough if they are to live as he would be glad to have them live. It is not enough to enable them to live as perhaps they would have a right to live in prosperous times. But is not a dollar a day enough to buy bread with? Water costs nothing; and a man who cannot live on bread is not fit to live. What is the use of civilization that simply makes men incompetent to live under the conditions that exist"(12).

In another moment of economic and social crisis, the Great Depression of 1929, the Churches and their ministers in a southern milltown of the United States seem to have been equally supportive of the system:

"To sum up, for emphasis, in statements too sharply put: in the cultural crisis of 1929, Gastonia ministers revealed that their economic ethicways were products of the economic system in which they lived, with no serious modification by any transcendent economic or religious standard. They were willing to allow the power of religious institutions to be used against those who challenged this economic system, and themselves assisted in such use. At no important point did they stand in opposition to the prevailing economic arrangements or to drastic methods employed for their preservation. In no significant respect was their role productive of change in economic life. By and large, they contributed unqualified and effective sanction to their economic culture, insofar as their words and deeds make it possible to judge" (13).

Yinger concludes his discussion of Protestantism and the American middle classes with some reflections on a highly popular novel written at the end of the last century (23 million copies sold in the English editions, translated into 21 other languages and made into a movie):

"In the story, a 'dusty, worn, shabby-looking young man' arose in church one morning and told his story of privation and suffering, and then collapsed in the aisle. A few days later he died. Moved by this story, and with the encouragement of the minister, fifty members of the congregation, including an heiress, a college president, a railroad executive, a newspaper editor, a merchant, resolved never to do anything without first asking themselves the question: 'What would Jesus do?' Needless to say, their lives underwent an abrupt change. By means of this novel, millions of people found to their satisfaction that the alleviation of suffering required only the personal conversion of persons in high places. Moral Rearmament was anticipated" (14).

*Examples from more recent times*

These accounts do not tell the whole story, even for the Protestant Churches in the United States. The more recent social-gospel movement (it originated toward the end of the 19th century) and the activist clergy of the 1960's and 1970's have both left their mark on American society. But a recent study of the latter, in the State of California, serves only to illustrate the problem:

"Quinley's excellent study brings into sharp focus one of the most bitter dilemmas now facing organized religion. On the one hand, there is a committed clergy determined to assert its role of moral leadership on social issues, and there are aggregates such as liberals, intellectuals, the poor, and the oppressed who encourage or at least welcome those assertions. On the other hand, there are the churchgoers, the real organizational and financial backbone of religion, who demand a comforting, not a challenging religion" (15).

So too, an earlier study of college students in a number of major American universities suggests that religious belief is associated with an acceptance of culturally prescribed norms and valuations:

"Religious believers seem to feel more integrated in

society; nonbelievers seem more alienated from it. Religious believers tend to testify to the kinds of behavior and belief that conform to the standards of propriety of American culture; nonbelievers are less likely to do so... Perhaps these are all aspects of conformity to the dominant values of the social groups to which these students belong" (16).

Our examples have been drawn mainly from the history of the Protestant Churches in the United States. The history of the American Catholic Church was somewhat different, since it was until recently an immigrant, working-class Church; but it too showed little leadership on the racial issue, a role that was left to the black leaders of black southern Churches. It is easy to find examples from outside the United States of symbolic legitimation given by representatives of the Catholic Church to heavy-handed right-wing regimes.

I recall seeing a little more than a year ago the program for an International Youth Marian Congress held in a country with an extremely repressive martial-law government. The congress began with an "inspirational talk" by the First Lady, followed by a keynote speech delivered by the President, a Mass concelebrated by the Apostolic Nuncio and a number of bishops, and a coronation of the image of Our Lady of Fatima by the First Lady. Later there was a second "inspirational talk" by the First Lady and a concluding Mass celebrated by the Cardinal Archbishop. A daughter of the President and First Lady was honorary chairperson of the congress.

In all of these cases I would suggest that the problem is not with doctrine. The gospels and Christian social doctrine are there, but they still must be applied to specific situations. And social pressures, personal contacts, institutional interests, and the kind of information and experience to which one is exposed can powerfully influence the interpretation of concrete situations that one will accept and support.

Religion can, however, also *challenge* society's norms and its interpretation of reality, as is evident in the history of the Hebrew prophets, in the words and deeds of Christ our Lord himself, in the rise of the religious Or-



ders, in the various "religions of the oppressed," reform and revival movements in the history of Christianity. More recent examples are the religiously inspired liberation and human-rights movements of today. But the circumstances under which religiously motivated men and women will choose to "comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable," particularly when the comfortable are members of their own group, have only recently become the object of systematic study. On this point I would like to offer some reflections, which we may then finally relate to the Exercises (17).

*Needed: not only an experience of man...*

I would suggest that the motivation for a religious commitment to the reform of unjust structures lies in a twofold experience that touches the individual at the deepest level: an experience of man, crushed under the weight of those structures and frustrated in his every effort to provide a modicum of human dignity for himself and his children; and an experience of God, realized in prayer and in reflection on the gospel.

In the Philippines we found that a few days spent in and around the sugar plantations, for example, can provide something of this first type of experience: a view of the opulent life-style of the large landowners, compared with the misery and degradation, the infant mortality, malnutrition and illiteracy to which the workers and their families are subject. One can talk with and visit the families of courageous men who tried to organize labor unions on the plantations - and then simply disappeared or were arrested and murdered in prison; one can visit the courts of law and see at firsthand what "justice" the workers receive. After a period of such experiences, arguments about the definition of structural injustice, or about the relationship between our Christian commitment and work for justice, seem hopelessly academic.

It may be interesting to note also that the Philippine bishops and clergy can be arranged in a more or less consistent manner along a continuum of political, ideological and

theological positions from right to left, and that the individual's position on the continuum seems closely related to his situation and experience within the Philippine Church (18).

- The Ordinaries of large and long-established dioceses and the Apostolic Nuncio, men with major administrative responsibilities, give high priority to the doctrinal and organizational structure of the Church, insist on its non-political nature and interpret the martial-law situation in ways that will avoid conflict with the government.

- The younger bishops and the religious Superiors, particularly those working in the frontier areas of Mindanao, where the Church has few major institutions to protect but a tradition of innovative social action and lay leadership, take a middle position, insisting on the Church as people of God and criticizing the government strongly on the issue of human rights.

- Finally, a left position involving a theology of liberation and a willingness to collaborate with the Maoist underground is found among some priests and religious who have been deeply involved in social action, whose efforts have been frustrated by the martial-law regime, and who have witnessed the intimidation, imprisonment, torture and sometimes the brutal murder of simple farmers at the hands of drunken soldiers or military investigators.

Thus even theological positions can be accepted, it seems to me, not for "theological" reasons only but also because they offer an interpretation that makes sense of one's actual experience.

*...but also an experience of God*

We have found that this type of experience has to be complemented by a religious experience if it is to generate something more constructive than anger and bitterness. In fact, some of the bishops and others who seem most committed but also most balanced on the social question are at the same time opening houses of prayer, establishing groups of contemplatives in their dioceses, making long retreats,

and talking of the development of a new spirituality for our times.

This last observation about religiously inspired leaders in the Philippines coincides with certain conclusions based on the diaries and letters of antislavery campaigners in the United States prior to the Civil War (19). It has been established that one group of leaders in the campaign to abolish slavery had been powerfully influenced by a Protestant revival movement, and that in many ways these individuals differed from those who had not been so influenced: for instance, in their personal writings they often referred to experiences of God, in moments of prayer and on other occasions. The other group rarely made such references, they insisted that "slavery is sin," but appealed to slaveholders in the name of shared Christian values and in a spirit of charity (the first group tended to be vituperative and offensive in dealing with those who disagreed with them). Thus the second group had considerable success, not only in forming more than 1,600 local antislavery societies, but also in convincing individual slaveholders to free their slaves; whereas the first group seems to have rather polarized the situation and possibly provoked the outbreak of the Civil War.

Thus it seems clear that religious experience can inspire action directed toward social change, and influence it both in its style and in its results. It can motivate major organizational efforts, deep personal commitment and the courage to risk one's life for a cause: many of these religiously inspired leaders faced violent opposition, and one at least died at the hands of a proslavery mob.

#### 4. CAN THE EXERCISES IMPART A ZEAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE?

Up to this point we have presented an image of man as strongly conditioned by external pressures and also by the values and interpretations he receives from society, to conform to its standards of behavior and judgment, even though these may support and legitimate widespread structured injustice. We have noted that religion often serves as an additional legitimating force, encouraging conformity

to society's standards. At the same time, though, it can also encourage a more critical stance in the believer, particularly when he has had the double experience (of man and of God) that we described in the last section. Now finally, we can ask where the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius enter the picture; and here I shall be somewhat tentative, offering hypotheses for reflection and discussion.

To the extent that the Exercises succeed in freeing the exercitant from his inordinate attachments to wealth, honor and the like, they free him from the external constraints by which society is accustomed to control his behavior. The man who is truly indifferent is truly free, free to "climb every mountain" or, in the words of St. Ignatius, "to give and not to count the cost, to fight and not to heed the wounds, to toil and not to seek for rest."

But (and this is my deepest concern) it appears to me that if the exercitant's conversion remains at that level, he may return to his daily life as simply a more highly motivated, sincere and selfless servant and defender of an unjust social structure. One thinks of retreats sponsored by landowners and employers in the Philippines for their workers, with the explicit purpose of making them more docile; of retreats for the military, for businessmen, or just for ordinary citizens in an affluent society. Do these retreats encourage a critical look at the structures of the society in which they live, and at the interpretations that legitimate those structures? It may be worth recalling here that even St. Ignatius, with all of his spiritual insight, was not entirely free from the standards of judgment of his time: in his letter to Peter Canisius at Vienna, August 13, 1554, he suggested that it might be a salutary thing if the goods of some heretics were confiscated, or if they were sent into exile or even put to death (20).

Our freedom from the interpretations and shared meanings of our societies can never be total; else we could hardly function in those societies. But there are elements in the Exercises that can, I think, encourage a more critical and questioning attitude toward them: the concept of God's absolute transcendence in the Principle and Foundation; the reality of sin in the First Week; the

conflictual image of society in the Kingdom; the Devil sending his minions into all areas of the world (and all social structures?) in the Two Standards; Christ's running conflict with the religious oppressors of his day, and his rejection of the interpretations by which they legitimated their power; his table-fellowship with outcasts and sinners, a challenge to the standards of his society and seemingly to the Law, which was the basis of its self-understanding; his death at the hands of the legal authorities, which was the outcome of all of this; and the Resurrection, which was the Father's judgment on it all.

*An experience of God is not enough for the social apostle*

One need not be a liberation theologian to see these themes in the Exercises, themes that have been developed in greater detail by Father Philip Land among others (21). But I ask myself whether this is sufficient, whether exposure to the Exercises understood in this way is enough to make the exercitant realize the "relative character of the behavior and values presented by such and such a society as definitive and inherent in the very nature of man" (22). Frankly, I suspect that it is not. For it provides only one half of the twofold experience of which we spoke a while ago: the experience of God, but not that of man.

Let me illustrate this with just one case. Two summers ago the Christian Life Communities held an international gathering in the Philippines, during which the participants made guided retreats. But some of them, in an earlier phase of the program, underwent a short period of "exposure" to the reality of poverty in and around Manila, together with conferences that related the misery they saw to the wider socio-economic structures of the nation. One of the priests who gave the guided retreats told me that the concerns during the retreats of those who had had the exposure were vastly different from the concerns of those who had not; their eyes had been opened to a whole new aspect of reality, which began immediately to have an impact upon their spiritual lives.

Perhaps then, in the apostolate of the Exercises, we should take very seriously the words of Decree 4:99 of the 32nd General Congregation. Perhaps, indeed, no one should make or give the Exercises who has not had the exposure to the poor that the decree suggests. Let me conclude with its actual words:

"If we have the patience and the humility and the courage to walk with the poor, we will learn from what they have to teach us what we can do to help them. Without this arduous journey, our efforts for the poor will have an effect just the opposite from what we intend, we will only hinder them from getting a hearing for their real wants and from acquiring the means of taking charge of their own destiny, personal and collective. Through such humble service, we will have the opportunity to help them find, at the heart of their problems and their struggles, Jesus Christ living and acting through the power of the Spirit. Thus can we speak to them of God our Father who brings to himself the human race in a communion of true brotherhood."

\* \* \*

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## 'OUR WAY OF PROCEEDING'

Pedro Arrupe

1. This talk is a further contribution to what I have said on other occasions about the renewal, updating and adaptation of the Society as called for by the last two General Congregations, in implementation of Vatican II.

My intention in presenting the new image that the Council's *aggiornamento* gave the Society is not at all an apologetic one. It is rather to make certain observations in keeping with what Vatican II told us: "The appropriate renewal of religious life involves two simultaneous processes: a continuous return to the sources of all Christian life and to each community's original inspiration, and an adjustment of the community to the changed conditions of the times" (*Perfectae Caritatis*, 2).

Our CG 32, reacting to requests from all over the world, gave, in its decree on "Jesuits Today," an authoritative description of Jesuit identity in our day. That decree defined what being a Jesuit today means. But after looking at that updated identity, we now have to ask ourselves: Have the idiosyncrasy and behavior of the individual Jesuit and the Society as a religious Order changed? And if so, how?

To put the question in more explicit terms: How, concretely, are we in the Society to resolve the tension between those two guidelines of the Council: that we should go back to our earliest sources and yet adapt to modern times?

Or to formulate the question in Ignatian terminology: How has "our way of proceeding" evolved? How should it have evolved, and how should it evolve in the future?

2. *Three different levels.* There is an important division to be introduced here, inasmuch as a study of the constant factors in our attitudes and behavior, both individual and institutional, can be most revealing. Indeed, psychology shows that there is an inevitable interaction between the deepest layers of our inmost being (our basic identity) and our attitudes and feelings. We may say that our identity, quite naturally, takes on certain attitudes, a certain spiritual and human manner that becomes our characteristic way of proceeding. This way of proceeding, in turn, falls into certain patterns adapted to changing circumstances and times, making possible a unity within pluriformity.

Thus, there are three levels: that of the essence or spirit, that of mental or operational attitudes deriving from the first, and that of the external traits that make up our visible image. For St. Ignatius, "our way of proceeding" is something that goes beyond those three levels and hence is judged differently by different people. Obviously, this dialectic of returning and adapting that the Council calls for does not mean that we must accept or reject *en bloc* what our way of proceeding has been for four and a half centuries - and most certainly not our way of proceeding as a superficial observer would understand it who looks only at external appearances and draws hasty, unwarranted conclusions about it.

And so, when examining our way of proceeding, we will have to distinguish carefully: 1) what makes up the Society's fundamental charism (its distinctive identity), 2) the basic and common attitudes that derive from them with logical necessity, and 3) other complementary traits that are much more likely to change.

We must also remember that Ignatius was really two persons: he was Ignatius the Founder, but also Ignatius the General, a particular Superior at a specific moment, the shaper of the heterogeneous Jesuit community in Rome during the 1550's. To regard his legacy as a monolithic block inflexibly fixed for all time would be to ignore the most fundamental principles of the spirit and letter of Ignatian legislation.

3. *Vatican II.* The phrase "our way of proceeding" that Ignatius originated reflects very nicely the need for self-identity that any newborn religious Order or congregation experiences. Without using that particular phrase, Vatican II expressed the substance of what Ignatius meant by it:

- "the special form of their life" (*Lumen Gentium*, 45)

- "the character proper to each religious community" (*Christus Dominus*, 3)

- "their own special character" (*Perfectae Caritatis*, 2b-c).

These expressions, different from those the Council used when referring to the function or mission of a religious institute, seem to emphasize the special way in which each religious body relates to the Church and the world. Logically, these expressions are a subsequent notion to that of a given institute's charism, and closer to its "image" or "style."

4. *The first companions* - and Ignatius more than all the rest - felt this need for defending themselves. We may even say that their way of life preceded their decision to perpetuate in the form of a new religious Order the bonds that kept them together around Ignatius, who called them "my nine friends in the Lord" (1).

Thus two expressions are used. The older, indeed the original one is "our way of life" (*forma vivendi*): it is the term that Ignatius and his companions use for their profession on April 22, 1541 in the basilica of St. Paul Outside the Walls (2). The other one, which will become dominant, thanks to the frequent use made of it in the Constitutions, is "our way of proceeding." In 1539 (a year and a half before that profession ceremony), when Pope Paul III had just approved orally the Formula of the Institute, Ignatius writes full of joy to his nephew Beltrán that the Pope "has approved all of our way of acting" (3). And Salmeron uses the identical phrase to give the happy news to Lainez (4), who at the moment was away from Rome. Xavier too uses it from Portugal, when referring to

poverty (5). The expression was known to all the members of the group (6).

In the beginning, then, "our way of life" and "our way of proceeding" are parallel expressions meaning "our institute." "Way of life," which appears in the Formulas of Paul III and Julius III in the variant *institutum vitae*, and in the texts used in the first professions (7), is more juridical or formal: it emphasizes the very essence of the new Order. Later, as the expression becomes broader and admits of wider meanings, "our way of proceeding" takes precedence in the Constitutions, taking on connotations not only of identity, but also of attitudes deriving from identity.

5. *The Constitutions.* The expression "our way of proceeding," with its variants "our way of acting" and the "Society's way of acting," appears no less than 16 times in the Constitutions: [92, 137, 142, 152, 216 (twice) 321, 398, 409, 547, 589, 624, 629, 680, 778, 815]. It is invoked in connection with very disparate things of very different importance.

Fortunately for us, the frequent usage of hendiadys (use of two parallel nouns instead of a noun and a modifier), as was the literary conceit in those days, makes it possible to determine in each case the meaning of "our way of proceeding." The most obvious examples are the following:

[92] "in conformity with our profession and way of proceeding"

[152] "in view of the end of our institute and our way of proceeding"

[216] "the labor that is required in our way of proceeding"

[216] "to live under obedience and to adapt himself to the Society's way of proceeding"

[321] "conditions that are not fully in conformity with the order and way of proceeding that the Society customarily uses"

[398] "the sincerity of our way of proceeding, which is to give freely what we have freely received"

[547] "any point of perfection... in the observance of all the Constitutions and in our way of proceeding in the Lord"

[589] "the freedom required for our way of proceeding in the Lord"

[680] "difficulties pertaining to the whole body of the Society or its way of proceeding."

In all these instances (I purposely omit five others [137, 409, 629, 778, 815] because they use the phrase "way of proceeding" in a quite extraneous sense), the Society's way of proceeding refers to all those specific and differentiating qualities in the Society that distinguish it from other religious Orders. It is something we must consider as essential, or flowing from the essence of our charism, and that would certainly have struck an observer in those days as clearly in contrast with other religious. Salmeron's letter to Lainez and Ignatius's to his nephew Beltrán had that same meaning: "Our whole way of proceeding has been approved and confirmed by the Vicar of Christ our Lord."

This way of proceeding means that "we must be ever ready to travel about in any part of the world" [92]; it would keep the Society from admitting "persons who are very difficult or unserviceable" [152], or sick [216], or "unable to live under obedience" [216]. Our way of proceeding gives us great apostolic freedom [589], but on the other hand, it insists that to show the purity of our intentions we forgo any financial recompense for our labors [398], to the point that we must politely decline any offers to endow our colleges if those offers are not "fully in conformity with the order and way of proceeding that the Society customarily uses" [321].

Finally, the Society's way of proceeding is so important for Ignatius that, apart from the case of electing the successor to a deceased General, the General Congregation may be convened only "when it is necessary to deal with... difficulties pertaining to the whole body of the Society or its way of proceeding" [680].

At other times, our way of proceeding applies to less essential qualities, even though one would look for them in the perfect Jesuit: such might be his way of directing the Exercises [409], a certain circumspection and discretion [142], and a flexibility and prudent adaptation in his way of reacting and behaving in unexpected situations [624].

Clearly, in all these provisions of the Constitutions St. Ignatius is giving us his thought as Founder rather than as General.

6. *In the mind of Ignatius.* Let us look for the origin of that expression "our way of proceeding" and try to fathom its salient elements.

St. Ignatius, seeing the life style that the first companions were leading in imitation of that of the Apostles, planned the nascent Society as something quite different from the monastic and mendicant Orders of his day. And since it would be different, its way of acting would be different.

Right from the start, the Society was a group of clerics vowed to the state of perfection, in a religious institute approved by the Church and bound in a special way to the Roman Pontiff: "The Society is no more nor less than a clerical society of religious" (8).

This was not just a clever juxtaposition. What it really meant soon became apparent in the Society's way of proceeding: its life, dress, housing, etc. were to be comparable, not to those of religious, but to those of ordinary priests, as the Formula of the Institute stipulates [8].

7. But this new institute of clerks regular has a purpose all its own too, and that purpose will determine its way to proceeding in important ways. The opening words of the General Examen [3]: "The end of this Society is to devote itself with God's grace not only to the salvation and perfection of the members' own souls, but also with that same grace to labor strenuously in giving aid toward the salvation and perfection of the souls of their fellow men" might make us think that the Society has a double purpose. But that is not so: St. Ignatius always speaks of the Society's purpose in the singular, e.g., "the only end sought in this matter and in all others" [508]. The first half of that quotation ("not only... the member's own soul") refers to a duty which, though incumbent on all Christians, becomes the prime objective of religious in the monastic, eremitical or contemplative Orders and is mentioned here merely as

something taken for granted. But the Society's purpose comes in the second half of the phrase: to give aid toward the salvation and perfection of the souls of their fellow men and, more concretely, as specified by that adverb "strenuously," which is an echo of the Ignatian *magis*, the "greater glory of God" [156, 307, 603].

"What is the Society's purpose?" asks Nadal. And he gives, the answer: "The greatest of all: the salvation and perfection of souls for the greater glory of God" (9). "That is indeed the Society's only purpose: to strive the greater glory of God in all things" (10).

8. Nadal alludes to the purpose of the Society as distinguished from that of other religious institutes, when he explains our "triple grace": the first is the "grace of baptism" that God grants to all the faithful; the second is the "grace of religious life" that religious receive for attaining the purposes of their religious community; and the third is the "grace of the Society," i.e., the Society's distinctive and special grace for attaining its specific purpose (11).

9. This purpose of the Society determines its way of proceeding. It opens world-wide possibilities for our apostolate; it puts a premium on our acceptance of the more difficult missions and, in consequence, calls for unlimited availability and mobility; it requires us to renounce any ministry involving a stability that would conflict with apostolic mobility, to forgo ecclesiastical dignities, to be limited by none of the restrictions on evangelizing activity that would affect mendicant or monastic congregations because of their traditional religious or community practices. Ignatius waves aside two elements that had been regarded as indissolubly wedded to the religious state: choir and the habit.

"The Society does not oblige itself to go here or there, and you can see the freedom it wants to have in the exercise of its ministries. For this reason the Society has neither choir nor a distinctive habit, but only that of honest priests; it does not bind itself to Masses or other commitments that would limit its freedom of purpose, in order to be more disencumbered and freer to go wherever our ministries are most needed" (12).

Can we imagine today what it meant to give up the religious habit, that source of prestige and respect, and to adopt the ordinary garb of a not very highly esteemed cleric in those days of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation? Araoz asserts this: "What was our idea in this matter of our dress? I was dying to see myself looking saintly by being discalced and wearing sackcloth. And it is astonishing that even though our Father himself had gone around shoeless and in sackcloth, he got the notion of adopting this garb - at a time when no dress was more discredited and less religious than that of priests; indeed, the habit doesn't sanctify those of the Society, but rather they sanctify the habit" (13).

10. Another item in our way of proceeding comes from our *poverty*: not accepting stipends for Masses and other ministries at a time when the accumulation of benefices was rife, when avaricious clergy were not few, and when fees for services, dispensations, the granting of indulgences, etc., were the normal thing.

11. The Society's *government* similarly involves novelities. The manifestly monarchical structure, the absence of any capitalism, the lifetime term of the General, the exceptional duration of the probation period, the difference of grades in the Society - all these are notorious departures in our way of proceeding.

12. The new Order's *asceticism* likewise introduces a breath of new air: the Exercises and their great themes that shape the Jesuit's entire life, discernment, the account of conscience, the paternal regime, the absence of penances and other austerities imposed by rule. Another new departure in the Order's spiritual style is its unique way of praying. For instance, the continuous circle of action-prayer-action... that Nadal describes for us as follows: "Our perfection goes like a circle: by seeking a perfection in our prayer and spiritual exercises in order to help our neighbor, and by means of that help of neighbor acquiring yet more perfection in prayer, in order then to help our neighbor even more" (14). It is the contemplative in action, the finding God in all things (15), a genuine synthesis of the authentic Ignatian asceticism, the specific "Society's way of proceeding" (16).



We must not fail to mention yet another characteristic of Ignatian asceticism that goes with the Society's way of proceeding: "battling under the standard of the cross" (17). Combat, a certain apostolic aggressivity that not only equips the Society for difficult missions, but at the same time makes it the natural target of persecution.

13. Finally, there is the *fourth vow*, that clearest expression of our bond to the Supreme Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ on earth, in whose immediate and unconditioned service the Society places itself from its very birth. The successive Formulas of the Institute are not the only Society documents that begin with this explicit profession of fealty to the Pope: years before the Formulas were written, obedience to the Pontiff was one of the prime objectives of the group of first companions. That obedience has always been one of the pillars of our way of proceeding (18).

14. There can be no more convincing proof of the originality of all these innovations than the backlash of misinterpretation and even scandal that greeted them in many places, as well as the obstacles that had to be overcome at many levels, including the highest, to maintain in their integrity the Ignatian intuition and our way of proceeding. The books about these "novelties" written in the 16th and 17th centuries to revile or defend the Society add up to a very considerable library.

No single statement better sums what we have said so far about the institutional elements that make up our way of proceeding than this: "Our Father Ignatius would not speak of the 'spirit of the Society,' but rather of 'the Society's way of proceeding'" (19).

15. *The 'instructions'*. Ignatius writes in the Constitutions: "No matter where the Superior sends anyone, he will give him complete instructions, ordinarily in writing, about the manner of proceeding, and the means that he desires to be used for the end sought" [629]. This refers to the general advice and detailed guidelines given on the occasion of some special mission. Obviously, these do not deal with the essence of the Society, nor

even with attitudes necessarily derived from its essence. They are simply applications to a given situation, couched in a particular style.

- Ignatius gave PP. Broët and Salmeron three instructions for their mission to Ireland, and among them is that masterly treatise of prudence and psychology that Ignatius entitled "About the way of negotiating and conversing in the Lord" (20). It was written in September, 1541.

- The "Instruction for the Council of Trent" (21), given to Laínez, Salmeron and Favre in 1546, contains, besides norms for conversation and meeting people, helpful recommendations about the Christian witness they should give and how to combine their official activity with the most humble ministries.

- "Things that seem likely to help those going to Germany" is the low-key title of the instruction Ignatius gave in 1549 to Salmeron and Canisius (22). Together with a lucid analysis of the purposes of that mission and the means for successfully carrying it out, Ignatius offers a series of wise spiritual counsels and rules of behavior.

- The "Instruction for P. Juan Nuñez, Patriarch of Ethiopia" (23), which has been praised for "its delicate knowledge of Oriental psychology," is not only a jewel of missiology, but also a clear illustration of the way of proceeding that St. Ignatius wanted in certain specific circumstances.

16. It is hard to convey even an idea, in this limited space, of the wealth of advice and suggestions - necessarily very concrete, abundant and heterogeneous - that St. Ignatius gives in these and other instructions. But they translate, in terms of real life, the very heart of our institutional way of proceeding. And they give us a picture of the Jesuit who is beginning to play a part on the religious scene of his time. Here are a few quotations that may serve as samples:

- "To speak little and late, to listen at length and with readiness... They should make their departure soon and graciously."

- "To converse... see first of what condition your hearers are and put yourselves in that same condition."

- "Remember that anything said will be - or at least can be - made public."

- "Be generous with your time: when you promise something for tomorrow, do it today if that be possible."

- "Live an exemplary life, so as to avoid not only evil, but even the appearance of evil. Comport yourself, as much as the Society's institute permits, according to the customs of those peoples."

- "Where there are opposing factions and parties, don't go against any of them, but show that you are in a mid-position and that you love both sides."

- "Not only one's interior seriousness of behavior helps very much [to obtain] authority, but also one's exterior way of walking, gesturing, dressing decorously, but above all, circumspection in one's words and maturity of counsels, both in what regards practical matters and in what regards doctrine. Part of this maturity is not to give your opinion hastily, if the matter is not easy, but to take time for studying and reflecting on it or discussing it with others."

- "You should defend the Holy See and its authority in such a way as to draw all toward their due obedience; but do not be regarded, because of your imprudent defense, as papists and thus lose credibility."

- "In celebrating the divine liturgies, like Mass and vespers, they should take care to be unhurried and audible, so that the public will be edified... The furnishings of the priest, deacon and subdeacon, as well as those of the altar, chalices, communion tables and instruments for making hosts should be carefully chosen."

- "See whether it would be good for you to take your meals apart from the others."

17. It is very Ignatian to be flexible in applying these rules of behavior, and to trust those who are on the spot. The Constitutions give few directives for what concerns external matters. "They should adapt

to their surroundings" (24). The Jesuit's life, as Ignatius intends it to be, is quite different from the monk's. His life has not only an interior dimension for his community, but also an exterior dimension for the world surrounding him. He must live with and like those to whom his apostolic labors are directed. His day-to-day life calls for constant readaptation and is thus more demanding than a traditional or static religious life: the monk's life is prescribed for him once for all, but that of the apostle calls for continuous readjustments.

18. *The Rules.* St. Ignatius wants it clearly understood that his legislation is written on two different levels. First, there are the Constitutions. And second, there is another set of norms at a lower level, regarding exterior things, that hardly belong in a corpus of permanently, universally valid laws like those in the Constitutions. These second norms are the Rules, small organic collections that regulate the way of proceeding in a particular area or the functioning of a particular house. The Constitutions foresee this type of norms and describe them as "other rules that can be adapted to the times, places and persons in different houses, colleges and employments" [136]. It was the profound wisdom of our Founder, who knew how to distinguish the great from the small, the permanent from the transitory, the universal from the local, the substantial from the accidental.

Polanco tells us that Ignatius was already drafting certain Rules in 1548 - praying over them, reflecting on them in the light of his experience. He either personally composed or promulgated by his authority no less than 24 sets of such Rules, starting with those meant for the College of Padua in 1546. Since the Constitutions had not yet been written, Simon Rodriguez had anticipated him a year earlier by writing a series of Rules for the College of Coimbra (25).

The Rules of Ignatius the Superior mark a way of proceeding much more detailed and exterior than those he wrote as Founder. While compatible with the lofty flights of his institutional laws and intuitions, they are obviously more contingent. Moreover, because they are particular and deal with the external facets of life, they are

more visible. Consequently, there is the danger that the observer will dwell on them, giving more importance to this description of the Jesuit's secondary traits in specific situations and eras than to the features that define his permanent and truly important way of proceeding; and that then, when the external image changes, in virtue of the truly Ignatian flexibility, he may wrongly conclude that the Society's way of proceeding (let us not say here its way of being) has been abandoned.

This danger is all the greater since Ignatius's immediate successors in the Generalate emphasize this subsidiary legislation, for understandable reasons. Laínez makes only a few changes, but Borgia edits the whole set of Rules in 1567, which then becomes a corpus that, especially in Mercurian's edition of them in 1580, is practically definitive. With a few retouches and additions by Acquaviva, they are approved by General Congregation 7 in 1616 and remain unchanged (though they are applied with varying degrees of vigor) for more than three centuries until General Congregation 27 in 1923 and the edition of 1932 (26).

19. These prescriptions are of very uneven importance. But in all of them there are wise principles, both natural and supernatural. It would be unfair to treat them with the irony and hauteur of someone reading them with the hindsight of the last quarter of the 20th century. Many of the principles that inspire them are eternally true. Only their formulation, which may have been suitable for the spiritual and cultural climate of the Counter-Reform and the baroque period, makes them less than appropriate for our day. But they were visible signs of our way of proceeding and they helped to produce the image of the Society and the individual Jesuit that won the high esteem of not a few generations and served as a point of reference for many religious congregations that arose in subsequent centuries.

A single example: the Rules of Modesty, which St. Ignatius composed with careful attention, long periods of prayer and copious tears, may contain certain details that hardly fit every age. But no one can deny the value of their insights or the importance they give to external

conduct as a mirror of interior values. One's image is, after all, an immediate means of communication.

Our way of proceeding was a value that Ignatius always stoutly defended. At all costs, he protected it from any deviation toward monastic or conventual practices - and from anything that would, in an opposite deviation, minimize the Society's sacerdotal nature or apostolic thrust. A good part of the tensions among some of his early followers that Ignatius had to contend with arose from that insistence of his.

We know too how, in the era of the Encyclopedia and the Enlightenment, anti-Church attacks distorted the image of the Society and of the typical Jesuit through sectarian and lampooning pamphlets and the definitions in various dictionaries of the day. Let us be candid enough to admit, though, that certain episodes in the Society's history, inevitable perhaps in any institution that has a centuries-long history, and (why not say so?) a certain lack of needed renewal also on the Society's part may have given at least partial grounds for those caricatures.

20. *Beyond the mountains and the sea: Nadal.* The Society grew and spread out with vertiginous speed even before the Constitutions were written (27). Our way of proceeding already existed, however: it was simply the way of life of the group of the first companions that had been spelled out, in all basic essentials anyway, in the Formula. But the Society now faced a vitally necessary double task: to transmit this authentic way of proceeding to the Society's new recruits and yet to preserve a unity of spirit and even a "uniformity... to the extent that the different qualities of persons, places and the like permit" [671].

Jerome Nadal, the Mallorcan whom Ignatius had to use all his perseverance to win over, was the spokesman for Ignatian ideas, both before the death of the Founder and afterward. He, more than anyone else, helped to implant our way of proceeding, especially in Italy and the Iberian peninsula. Like the other first companions, he used that phrase, in season and out of season, to synthesize what was specific and distinctive of the Society. "God prompted Father Master Ignatius, giving to

him - and through him to us - the grace that we now follow and guide ourselves by: our special way of proceeding, which distinguishes us from other religious" (28). And more explicitly in another of his statements: "Religious Orders differ in their way of proceeding." The "grace of the Society" meant, for Nadal, the help that every Jesuit, and the Society as a whole, receive to be faithful to our Rule.

21. When, after the death of Ignatius, Nadal visited the Society's houses and colleges to explain the Constitutions, he used to carry a notebook with him in which he jotted down ideas for his conferences. The notebook was entitled: "About the way of proceeding in the Society" (29). Let me quote a few out of the fifty or so of those thoughts:

- "The vocation of Jesuits is a sort of brilliance shining forth from Christ: it fills and motivates them. From it is born a strong desire and determination to struggle for the salvation and perfection of souls, under obedience to the hierarchical Roman Church."

- "Our way of life, exteriorly, is common, but poor. And interiorly, we strive to obtain great perfection, with God's grace."

- "The Jesuit seeks perfection in all virtues... but very intensely obedience and abnegation and prayer... in all activities."

- "The Society's way of proceeding is with gentleness yet firmness."

- "It examines each one's vocation with great care... and helps and strengthens it with long probations."

- "It has great freedom for placing each one in his grade."

- "The Jesuit has facility in prayer and in finding God in all things."

- "Virtues should be directed toward action."

- "He practices obedience of judgment very particularly."

- "He has a desire of suffering for Christ."

- "Conversation is clear, joyous, devout, easy, familiar and simple."

- "The Jesuit should never be idle nor indulge in conversations except for some purpose."

- "He is free in the Lord for conversing and dealing with others, but he has no intimacy with women, even though they be devout ones, nor does he accept the care of nuns."

- "Superiors are not obliged to follow the advice of their counselors."

22. *Christ, our Model.* The institutional elements that Ignatius meant to be included in our way of proceeding are all decidedly Christological. The Society's unconditional radicality in following Christ determines its apostolic parameters. And their contemplation of Christ's person inspires in all Jesuits a desire to imitate his life. The model is always Christ: more precisely, it is Christ as seen in the Exercises. Not in vain, after all, is the Society an institutional blueprint of the Exercises. There are peak moments in this inspiration:

- The Principle and Foundation: from it spring forth indifference and availability.

- The colloquy in the meditation on sin: the question "What shall I do for Christ?" has no other answer, for Ignatius and his followers, than a total commitment.

- The Kingdom of Christ and the Two Standards: the following of Christ becomes our life and goal, with the radicality of the *magis*.

- The Contemplation for Achieving Love: Christ challenges us in all of creation, in all men. From them, he loves; in them, he wants to be loved and served.

- Discernment of spirits: this technique is crucial in Ignatius's thinking; it was used often and to good effect in the original planning of the Society.



- The Rules for Thinking with the Church: Ignatius always strove to make the retreatant realize that he is a member of the Church and have an explicit attitude of fidelity and service. The Society, which was born to serve Christ and his spouse the Church under the Roman Pontiff - and bound to the Pope by special bonds - is the ultimate expression of that fidelity and service (30).

But the Exercises do not show us these features of the Society's way of proceeding only in broad outline. The life that we strive to imitate is the person of Christ. Ignatius speaks of Christ "our Model and norm" (EE 344), Christ who "gave us an example that in all things possible to us we might seek, through the aid of his grace, to imitate and follow him, since he is the way that leads men to life" [101]. This last excerpt from the Constitutions is nothing but an expression of that prayer from the Exercises when we "ask for an understanding of the life of truth exemplified by our true Commander-in-Chief; also for grace to imitate him" (EE 139).

In the Exercises, we contemplate the person of Christ in action in the mysteries of his mortal life, and we use our senses to grasp him: "Look in imagination ... meditating and studying in detail his situation... Listen to what he is saying or might say" (EE 121-122). The retreatant "should imagine that he is watching Christ our Lord taking a meal with his disciples; he should study his manner of eating and drinking, looking and talking" (EE 214). He should conduct himself "as a poor servant, looking after all their wants" (EE 114). "See, observe and study what they are saying... See and reflect on what they are doing... the journey they have to make, the hardships they have to put up with" (EE 115-116).

23. Ignatius's whole life was marked by this personal reference to Christ, but particularly during the days when he was writing the Constitutions: "Later, before the fire, I had a fresh representation of Jesus with great devotion and movement to tears" (Spiritual Diary: Feb. 24, 1544); "Turning to Jesus, I said: 'Lord, where shall I go or where [do you want to bring me], etc.; following you, my

Lord, I shall never be lost" (*ibid.*, March 5). "With the same love for Jesus, as if I were in his shadow, as if he were guiding me" (*ibid.*, March 3). "While preparing the altar, the thought of Jesus occurred to me and I felt a movement to follow him; it seemed to me interiorly, since he was the Head of the Society. a greater argument to proceed in complete poverty" (*ibid.*, February 23, 1544).

Ignatius feels powerfully drawn toward Christ and sees him as the justification and model for his work. With an iron logic, he himself takes the triple step that he recommends in the Exercises: to know Christ, love him, follow him. In great things as in small things, Ignatius is ever constant in that love which, at his conversion, makes him want to know - at the cost of dangers and penalties not easily imaginable today - whatever remains on this earth that is connected with and evocative of the person of Christ: the holy places. His own way of proceeding, and the way of proceeding he wants for his Society, in great things as in small, is this: to imitate perfectly Christ, who was perfect God, but also perfect man.

24. *Between two epochs.* The passing centuries did not affect the Society's essential way of proceeding at all; indeed, they affected its image very little. The Society's fidelity to its ideals enabled it to keep its apostolic vigor.

In order to restore also the traditional image of the Jesuit when it was restored in 1814, the Society made a valiant effort to get back in all their purity not only what the Constitutions defined as essential elements of our way of proceeding, but as many of the typically Jesuit external traits as possible too. The first was needed for the sense of identity that the Society needed after the hiatus of the Suppression. The Jesuits of the restored Society agreed with Clement XIII when he said: "Sint ut sunt, aut non sint." For them - and this is understandable in the socio-religious circumstances of that era - it was hard, not to say unnecessary and even inadvisable, to separate in our way of proceeding the three levels I pointed out above. Any change in external things would be instinctively regarded as an infidelity in essentials.

25. The 20th century has, as we all know, gone through one of the most sweeping and profoundest cultural revolutions in the history of humanity. A new world and a new man have been born. The Society, in its limited way, is grappling with the same world-wide challenge that faces the Church: adapting to the new reality. Vatican II and its Jesuit counterparts - CG 31 and CG 32 - are prime examples of this updating effort.

The Society has striven to go back to its original sources by giving new luster to the perennial values of the Ignatian charism and way of proceeding. Other secondary and less essential elements can and even will have to change in virtue of the Ignatian *magis* and the rule of "tantum quantum" from the Exercises.

Jesuits too, caught up in the general ecclesial renewal, have modified certain external factors in their image. A hasty observer, looking only at appearances, might conclude that certain important, perhaps even essential components of the Society's way of proceeding have changed. He could say the same about the Church too - but in both cases he would be wrong. Still, it is only fair to admit that certain superficial aspects of the modern-day Jesuit do indeed differ from the image that such an observer knew in the past.

26. The most visible feature of the Jesuit, his cassock, is today optional, and our observer will probably not see it very often among coming generations of Jesuits. But that does not mean that we have deviated from our norm of following the practices of honest clerics. Nor will this observer see Jesuits inevitably accompanied by a companion when they go out, as called for by the "rule of having a companion." We no longer build the splendid late-Gothic façades or churches with soaring roofs that dominated the midcity skyline. The interior of Jesuit churches is different too, as called for by today's liturgical norms.

Even the Jesuit residence looks different now. It may be less of an inaccessible sanctuary, and noisier too, with the meetings of work groups and apostolic teams. The refectory, once an almost sacred spot, today is a place for encounters and conviviality, more and more open to welcome non-Jesuits. We have rethought our rule of cloister too,

now that our Fathers and Brothers depend on women for domestic, secretarial and other work.

27. Likewise, our style of pastoral activity and ministry of the word have to a certain extent changed. Preaching, which used to mean principally directing novenas, May devotions and parish missions, has become largely a matter of homilies, given to reflection groups as often as not and closer to day-to-day life. Today there are as many retreats for individuals or very small groups (not to mention certain somewhat forgotten kinds of retreats, e.g., "in daily life") as Exercises given to large groups (the text of the Exercises never mentions "groups"). Parish ministry is now done more carefully and in accordance with the diocesan or national pastoral program. Our churches thus are scarcely different from diocesan parishes, now that their former somewhat special type of pastoral attention has disappeared.

28. Even the individual Jesuit is different in some respects from what he was in the past. He used to be considered to be more personal, somewhat reserved, less inclined to mixing socially with people. In his own community too, the Jesuit tended to be reserved and not too communicative, even in spiritual and liturgical matters: discussions, exchanging ideas, brainstorming - these practices were viewed somewhat askance. The daily time schedule was rigidly programmed and faithfully rung out by a house bell. Flexibility in choosing one's time for relaxation and access to the information media were definitely limited. Today, the young Jesuit is trained to use freedom responsibly, to share his faith, his life, his experiences; he gets an earlier, more direct contact with the world that some day soon he is to evangelize.

Study and work used to be done with more regularity and formality. There were spiritual directors, usually quite competent ones, to guide our religious life; indeed "regular life" was supported by fixed activities and controlled surroundings. External penances and reading in the dining room (both of which were introduced in the time of St. Ignatius) helped to provide a constant spiritual atmosphere.

29. There is no need to dwell on the less felicitous elements that made up that ideal world, nor to criticize what some might regard as its triumphalism. Some may say that it fostered individualism, that its tightly regulated spiritual life could degenerate into formalism, or that the discipline was overprotective and could bring on psychological inhibitions and repressions. Some may say too that the Society, so unified and stereotyped, gave an unfortunate impression of aloofness, self-adequacy and superiority. Or that pastoral care, sometimes organized (on the pretext of our exemption) with no thought for co-ordination with the work of the diocese or other religious, was effectively creating two parallel Churches.

We should not too quickly brush aside other reproaches either: the fact, here and there, of excesses of zeal and of personal blunders. Sometimes these were the peccadillos that are the obverse of undoubted virtues, or the contrasting efforts of those who saw things from inside or from outside. So too, reserve and discretion are easily mistake for insincerity, intrigue or secretiveness; care for the most capable and most practicing can be read as elitism or neglect of those in need; and the defense of colleagues can seem like clannishness.

30. But it would not be fair to scoff at or deny the immense values of the image of the Jesuit of past centuries. Because under the externals that were the most visible but least important aspects of our way of proceeding, not only its essential elements were alive and operative, but also the attitudes that inevitably follow from them. The typical Jesuit had, for instance, a solidity of formation and doctrine that made many of them excellent spiritual directors, professionals in almost every branch of human knowledge, publishers of influential books and magazines, successful evangelizers in Christian and newly discovered lands, ardent champions of the hierarchical Church - and they gave the Society an undeniable good name. The Jesuit was known for his serene external bearing, the distinction of his dealings, his devoutness in celebrating Mass, the trustworthiness of his teaching, and his love for the Society. In general, Jesuit churches were admired for the dignity of their ceremonies, their easily available sacraments, the quality of their

preaching and the vigor of their various associations and sodalities.

31. None the less, together with this positive image of the individual Jesuit and of the Society, there was always, down the centuries, especially in non-Catholic countries, the no less widespread caricature of the legendary Jesuit. By exaggerating or inventing defects, hiding or misinterpreting virtues, and attributing false intentions, a false image of the Jesuit was created: he was thought to be crafty, proud, devious in his dealings, a legacy-chaser, a fawner on the powerful, an intriguing plotter. Such was the portrait that certain sectarian dictionaries (and other standard ones even today) drew of the Jesuit. For them, the Society, apart from its legendary wealth, controls from the shadows vast capital resources, has overthrown governments and provoked wars for its own or the Papacy's gain, has poisoned wells, fostered regicides, resorted to the dagger and the pistol, and mentally tortured the dying; it has founded an empire in Latin America, intrigues today in the Vatican, and in a word, seeks to dominate the world.

32. Here, I repeat, I am not judging the past but looking for the perennial - and today's - version of the Jesuit way of proceeding, as our Founder would do if he were alive, so that, while preserving the permanent elements that transcend any given era, I can find the image best suited to this postconciliar world of ours. In other words, I would like to contemplate Christ again in terms of the modern world, as Ignatius himself would do, for only Christ is the Jesuit's never-failing model and source of inspiration. In him, the Jesuit must rediscover the traits that make up his own identity and stamp his apostolic activity, today as anytime: the traits of steadiness and yet audacity, those of being contemplative in action and of being present in the world.

33. *Control of this change.* Not every change is a capitulation or a move to a lesser perfection; some changes are a necessity or even an improvement. The Society, like the Church, has to live in terms of today. And this is not always easy: sometimes the changes have to be made amid shifting points of reference and competing values

that must all be respected. In our search for new forms, we can commit errors. But sometimes it is worse not to try to change.

The difficulties of our present era are particularly challenging, not only because the fluctuations of society give us a brand new type of candidate with heightened sensitivities and aspirations, but also because uniformity, with once was more feasible and could be imposed by fiat, today simply does not work in a world where new countries and new cultures are appearing and many of the former missionary-sending countries are being de-Christianized. We must be willing to jettison accidental forms if they are counterproductive, rather than hold on, in the name of standardization, to formal practices that today's sensibilities have relegated to the dust-heap.

34. But if these changes violently polarize our communities, with some members verging toward integrism and others verging toward secularism, interpersonal tensions will seriously compound the objective difficulties. Here are some of the major dilemmas we must answer:

- How can we determine, in our way of proceeding, the overlaps between essential points and contingent ones?

- What elements in the image of the Jesuit should be the same everywhere, and which ones can be left to free choice or to the requirements of a local inculturation?

- Where do we draw the line in the drift toward secularism?

- How are we to combine a life of insertion with the requirements of our personal and community religious life?

- How far can we go in identifying with the poor and oppressed in their struggle for justice, which so often means a particular political structure?

- How much value are we to put on keeping our great apostolic institutions?

- What limit are we to put on pluralism: in life style, political opinions, research, teaching, books and magazines, etc.?

- How are we to judge concrete cases of professionalization?

This list, which could go on and on, shows that change of forms - partly imposed from the outside and partly sought by us from the inside - is a delicate process in which there is no guarantee that blunders will not be made. It is a process that we must guide very carefully, maintaining control, correcting deviations and encouraging sound initiatives.

35. Here are some key norms for controlling the process of these changes:

- We must safeguard and even positively promote our Ignatian charism and spirituality. In particular, should focus on making the *magis* an operative part of our lives.

- We should never do anything in independence of or contrary to the Society's decisions, or so as to cause traumatic pain to persons or communities.

- In all we do, we should discern, reflect on and evaluate our successes and mistakes.

- We should keep the local situation in mind, when deciding either what to do so as to make our apostolate more effective or what to avoid so as not to wound people's sensitivities.

- We must give a clear witness that we are consecrated men, not only as individuals, but as a body of religious with a common spirit.

- We must not let individual or group inertias block the growth and improvement of our work.

- We should make thinking with the Church our hallmark and follow with Ignatian loyalty the local, national and universal Church hierarchy's guidelines.

- In multi-purpose communities that work with disparate cultural or social groups, common sense and charity will dictate limits to the pluralism of our public behavior. A discernment by all members of the community together will help the Superior in his decisions for the common good.



- We must never tolerate a situation that keeps a Jesuit from his normal spiritual life, from contact with his community and Superior, or from a sense of belonging to the Society, which wants to "only one heart and one soul" everywhere in the world.

36. *Values and countervalues today.* Youth - and young Jesuits are no exception - are keenly sensitive to certain values that, to some extent anyway, can affect our way of proceeding.

First of all, they reject anything that is, or even seems to be, conventionalism, etiquette or formalism and extol simplicity, naturalness and spontaneity. They also immediately find common ground with anyone who shares this attitude with them, regardless of differences of age, education or nationality.

On the other hand, they feel intensely the tragic situation of the great mass of humanity and, out of a fraternal and gospel-based solidarity, want to identify with that poor majority, to be inserted among them and make their problems their own. In practice, the Christian motivation of these sentiments is sometimes mixed with other, more humanitarian aspirations.

Some young Jesuits do not like being identified as religious by their dress or other externals, believing that they will thus have a greater freedom of action. Apart from exceptional cases, though, I do not believe this is in harmony with the Ignatian ideal. For it is not enough to live a life of consecrated religious interiority: we must openly proclaim our consecration by the exterior structures of our community life and personal presence and activity, though these can certainly vary according to times and places. St. Ignatius, who took great pains to see that no monastic ways of living be introduced into the Society, was at even greater pains to make it clear that joining his Society meant professing a life that was not at all of the world.

37. Another of the values of some of today's young Jesuits is their apostolic impatience. But we must be sure that our candidates are willing to go through as long a formation stage as may be necessary, and

to devote all their time and energies to a serious study, reflection and cultivation of other values. From the very start of their Jesuit lives, they should be involved in some sort of apostolate, but in keeping with a plan and without falling into an immediatism that would totally absorb them and be to the detriment of more important apostolates later in their lives that would require better formed apostles.

Some of today's young Jesuits seem to accept without questioning them a desacralization of culture and a secularization that would imply a clean break between the religious and the secular, and a restriction of anything having to do with cult. There may be redeeming aspects to this trend and it may be understandable as a reaction to past circumstances. But it ceases to be a value when it leads to a secularism that in practice denies transcendent values.

Another notable characteristic of some young Jesuits today is their exaltation of group values (which are not always the same thing as community values). As I pointed out above, young Jesuits are very open to participation and sharing, and this is a tremendously constructive quality when it includes the presence of the Superior and when the role of obedience and the limits of group dynamics are kept quite clear. These are not parallel, but convergent lines.

38. It would be unjust to deny the sincerity - and validity too - of many of these aspirations because on occasions they have led to excesses. But it would be equally wrong to accept this entire package of values without further discernment. Moreover, all of us, but particularly Superiors, should approach these values with a constructive attitude, not tolerating them, of course, if they are harmful, but building on them, purifying and using them in accord with the Ignatian charism and way of proceeding.

In this constructive effort, we must safeguard the principle of Jesuit identity, for many things good in themselves are not good for us, and we cannot and should not do everything: there are many ways of serving the Lord in the Church of God. The gospel's values are far

more lasting and fundamental than the simplistic formulas of those who prefer a vague and ingenuous equalitarianism to our Society's identity and way of proceeding.

A certain secularization of the external forms of our presence and activity may at times be necessary, but never the secularism, corrosive of all interior religious life, that it can degenerate into. Unless we keep a sound balance in this area, the normal and healthy growth of the Society will seriously suffer. An excessive secularization, with the consequent loss of our sense of identity with and of belonging to the Society, will inevitably produce a vacuum that will soon be filled with other values - political, social or ethnic, or even religious ones such as those connected with basic communities, ecumenism, the charismatic movement, etc. Very frequently, other more human and this-worldly attachments will also make their appearance, and our vocation to the Society, to the priesthood and even to the faith can be gravely threatened.

Let me mention two other less than positive trends of our times: superficiality and sensationalism. Our is a sense-centered civilization that lives on images, strong sensations and consumer goods. Consequently, it takes more self-discipline today than ever to undertake - and stick at - hard work, often hidden and without immediate results to show for it. Yet this is what the Jesuit will do who follows Christ and wants to live according to the Ignatian charism.

Some young Jesuits also show a certain psychological uncertainty. Belonging to a group can sometimes betray a lack of personal convictions and a need for security. The same must sometimes be said of an inordinate fascination for following transitory fashions and fads. We may wonder if sometimes there is not, behind a person's loud assertion of his independence and freedom, an insecure, less than mature personality. The "vigorous Ignatian spirituality" that Pope Paul VI praised is not for unstable personalities.

Finally, I point to a contradiction that occasionally is found in young people who are fired by good desires but do not have the maturity for carrying them out. This contradiction shows up in a certain verbal aggressivity or intransigence of manner, while at the same time they praise

dialogue and the willingness to listen. Their judgments, made in an ahistorical or too unilateral and simplistic way, fail to allow for the complexity of the problems and human situations amid which they live. Thus one dogmatism replaces another, one triumphalism replaces another, an excessive horizontalism replaces a no less exaggerated verticalism.

39. *Formation.* If I have dwelt so long on the profile of today's generations (and I am keenly aware that because of the brevity with which I have had to do it, some of the strong lines must be softened), it is because the Society very much needs to know who these new candidates are and what values they bring, how they help to form the new image of the Jesuit. In addition, we need to know what kind of formation they should be given, what values of our way of proceeding must be awakened in them so that they can fully share in the genuine Ignatian charism. The Jesuits of the future will be those we are now training. And we must know exactly what sort of Jesuit we want and should form. This is the task of the entire Society, but of Superiors particularly and those to whom, singly or in teams, this mission has been given.

But it would be unjust to make only younger Jesuits responsible for creating the new image of the Jesuit or for preserving our way of proceeding, while the rest of the Society would remain with arms folded. That would really give us (and in part, it is what sometimes happens) two images, two ways of proceeding, with the consequent tensions and hurt to our apostolate.

Hence, together with the formation of the newcomers there has to be a formation of those already in the Society. Permanent formation is all-important. I have written at length elsewhere about both levels of formation, and this is not the place for doing it again. I will say only that the primary content of formation is those elements of our way of proceeding that make up the core of our spirituality, our sense of identity and belonging; all the rest of our permanent formation is incidental. As the CG 32 said, formation must be fully integrated: spiritual, human, academic and apostolic.

40. I will say just a brief word about permanent formation. It is natural that some Jesuits, after long years in laborious but fruitful apostolates, are astonished and even nonplussed when they are urged to be "formed" again, as if they had not given good evidence of having already been well formed. But a correct understanding of what this ongoing formation means should help dissipate the resentment. Because, as I have had the occasion of explaining elsewhere, an ongoing formation is not only the acquisition of information and techniques, nor even the renewal of apostolic skills or the replenishing of energies. It is much more: it is the process of continuous apostolic readaptation to the Church of today and the world of today, amid constantly changing circumstances. It is also the desire of Vatican II (see *Optatam Totius*, 22 and, even more to the point, *Presbyterorum Ordinis*, 19), as well as of our CG 32,6: 18-20 and 35). Without constant adaptation to the realities we must cope with, our activity and image can hardly seem relevant to our contemporaries and we are unlikely to be apt instruments in God's hands for helping souls.

41. *Two concrete questions.* At this point, someone may ask: What are the specific ingredients in the Society's way of proceeding? And what external elements make the Society's image recognizable?

The answer is not easy, for the reasons I mentioned above: the complexity of the ingredients that go into our way of proceeding and the variability of their concrete expressions. But we can and must try to answer. Let me begin by answering the second question: about the external elements that make up our image.

Clearly, the first two levels in our way of proceeding that I described at the outset of this talk are common to all Jesuits: 1) the deepest level, that of the fundamental, institutional characteristics of our charism, and 2) the intermediate level, that of our apostolic attitudes or options, which derive by an almost logical necessity from the first level. These attitudes and options (I will develop them further on) are the ones that ultimately give the Society its historical image.

But there remains the third, surface level, that of external appearances, which are more contingent and open

to accomodation. Naturally, no single description can be given that will fit every son of the Society. Any Jesuit's age, stage of formation, occupation, surrounding situation, culture, the milieu he works in, etc., not only admit of but even impose a thousand variants. None the less, I believe I can give something of an answer *per modum negationis*, i.e., by excluding certain types who seem less clearly to have the basic elements of the Society's way of proceeding. I realize that none of the rough drafts I will offer actually exist as such. But in these ideal types I have conventionally grouped a variety of external traits that, in differing degrees and in a thousand different combinations, can be found in specific Jesuits.

42. The first type is the full-time *protester*. No doubt, denunciation can be a prophetic and evangelical duty. But it is equally true that one must know how, when, about what and whom, and in what terms to denounce, and in virtue of what principles, so that the protest will be truly evangelical and constructive. Our denunciation may, just possibly, be quite subjective: we may be destroying, with the virulence of a sniper, a project that needs co-ordination and even subordination on our part more than public protest. Haven't we grounds for suspecting the "protester" in someone who acts and looks like the protesters of past decades: he is sloppy in dress, has unkempt beard and hair, is boorish in behavior and speech, etc. Those external signs undercut any validity that his cause or inner motives may have, and certainly the Society does not want such signs attached to its image. Neither sincerity of convictions, nor true poverty, nor austerity of life have to be - or are, convincingly - expressed that way.

The second type is the *professionalist* who lets himself be totally absorbed by the secular aspects of his profession, even though it may have an undoubted apostolic value. He should not let his work put him in a practically independent life, disconnected from any community and any dependence on a Superior. He is in a particularly dangerous situation if he gets into such a work more by personal initiative than by a mission that the Society gives him after due discernment. Excessive professionalization can lead to a secularism that suffocates the spiritual life and all priestly work. Moreover, economic self-

sufficiency and freedom to travel can be used in a way not always in keeping with our way of proceeding. Anyone who recognizes (if indeed he manages to do so) that he is in a situation like this should realize that he is not living up to the image of the Jesuit.

A third type is the *irresponsible* Jesuit who sees no real value in such things as order, keeping appointments, the value of money, moderation in his recreation, etc. Often he has an unjustified allergy toward any check on his output of work, whether in studies or any other activity. And there can be danger, too, if he lets himself be irresponsibly free in his dealings with young women, even if they are religious. The image of the Society that such an individual offers is, to put it mildly, a bad one.

A fourth type is the *political activist*, which is something quite different from the social apostle. He may have a sincere desire of being "incarnated" among the poor and oppressed and of getting rid of unjust structures. But when the struggle for justice involves him, not in its legitimate field of Christian criticism and assistance and sharing, but in political and even party matters, sometimes with a total abandoning of his priestly "mission," his political or labor-union activism is hardly evangelical and he is hardly living and acting as one sent by the Society. Worse still if his ideological motivation is based on a concept of man, of society and of history in which Christ plays no part. Such activities and such an image do not belong to an authentic member of the Society.

Finally, there is the *fanatically traditionalist* type of Jesuit who builds his life around the symbols and practices of a bygone era: his mannerisms, the rigid schedule of his life, the formalism of his personal and liturgical practices and spirituality. He can adopt an intolerable prophetic stance, making himself an infallible interpreter of the gospel and a judge of the living and dead, speaking and writing passionately against persons and institutions. Or he can lapse into a depressive defeatism, a combination of bitterness and living in the past.

This Jesuit listens avidly to any pessimistic news; he acidly criticizes the younger generations, whose values

he is unable to accept and whose sins, real or imagined, he endlessly bemoans. He would never in the world have a bank account, but he quite possibly is well taken care of by like-minded and obsequious families. He is pained by the emptiness of our churches and the fickleness of those who once came to him for spiritual direction - but now no longer come; yet he never asks himself if those changes are not at least partly due to his spiritual narrowness and his lack of an ongoing formation.

In "our way of proceeding," he sees permanent values in what is only transitory, but fails to see that if he were truly Ignatian, he would follow the permanent and dynamic values of our Founder. In his heart (only in his heart?), he has never accepted CG 31 and CG 32, nor even Vatican II; nor does he see that his refusal to accept them is a far more serious failing than most of the external faults that he sees others committing out of weakness or an excess of zeal.

All these models are, I repeat, only rough sketches that in real life will very likely have redeeming features in any particular case. Moreover, we do not see in them the enormous capital of good will that these Jesuits have. None the less, even after making due allowances and admitting good will, these types are simply unacceptable because they do not at all reflect the Society's way of proceeding.

43. Now I go on to the other question: What are the genuine ingredients in the Society's way of proceeding?

On the deepest, institutional level (which, as we saw, the first companions also called their "way of life"), the elements in our way of proceeding are none other than those contained in the Formula of Popes Paul III and Julius III. Their uniqueness and the fidelity with which they have been observed can excuse me from expatiating on them here. Still, to refresh our memories, let me say that Pope Paul VI, speaking to the delegates to CG 32 as the "highest Superior of the Society," singled out four of those notes.

But between those foundational elements and the more external traits that have produced the pluriform image



of the Jesuit in various generations, countries and cultures, there is another, intermediate level of the options, attitudes, spiritual and human behavior that flow directly from our way of following Christ and by which we are known and recognized as a religious family among the many others that the Spirit has raised up and still raises up in his Church.

Each of these traits is not something simple, but a sort of living nucleus, rich in varied shadings. And all of them are so intermeshed that no one can be removed without disfiguring the over-all image. The list that I will give is affirmative, not exclusive, and it does not indicate an order of importance. These are just certain random traits - others might well have been included - that today need to be purified and reactivated.

44. *Love for the person of Christ:* Ignatian spirituality is eminently Christocentric. Love for Christ gives unity to everything in the life and work of Ignatius, and in our way of proceeding, for everything is a concrete application of that love on the level of attitudes and actions. Just as everything converges on Christ, so the love for Christ, in Ignatius's intuition, unifies the dialectical pairs into which our apostolic action is diffracted:

- prayer and action
- dedication to the perfection of self and neighbor
- use of supernatural and human instruments
- pluralism and uniformity
- one's own effort and total dependence on God
- poverty and having the most effective means
- local insertion and universality.

To live that intense love for Christ the person, to aspire to a "mind of Christ" that will make us be, seem and act like him, is the first and fundamental trait of our way of proceeding.

To attain this ideal, St. Ignatius turns to the Mother, so that she will place him with her Son (31).

45. *Availability:* this we understand as a readiness, an operative freedom, even an eagerness for any mission that may be given us. An availability made up, dialectically, of a total commitment to the mission received and simultaneously of a freedom for any other mission that may later be given us as a "better service." Availability is born from obedience and the desire to serve, for we are convinced that any mission so received is worth reshaping our lives for. At the same time, of course, we realize that no mission is so definitive that it can keep us from being open-minded, poised and ready for any other one that the Lord may show us (32).

46. *A sense of gratuity:* This conditions our availability, if indeed it is not even one of its practical components. It shows that we are free of any mundane interest, free for any mission and free for all men. Availability and clarity of the message are the two poles on which Ignatius based his vision of poverty, as we see in the *Liberation on Poverty*.

Work and alms, as means for a modest and explicitly austere livelihood, are two structures that have to be constantly purified of the ambiguity that they tend inevitably to acquire, for they can enslave us and adulterate that gratuity of our service which is essential to the Good News (33).

47. *Universality:* This trait too is implicit in availability. Readiness to go "to any corner of the world" means going not only beyond physical frontiers, but beyond the barriers of discrimination among men as the beneficiaries of our mission. It means going to each man, any man, precisely as man, to whom we owe ourselves as sent.

It would be contradictory, then, if our Jesuit administrative limits (our Provinces, our communities), which were created as helps to the mission, were to put limitations on our availability.

48. *A sense of oneness:* This is closely connected with our universality. It has its roots in the conviction that God "deigned to unite us to one another and to

bring us together" and that "we should not sever God's union and bringing together, but rather every day we should strengthen and more solidly ground it" (*Deliberation of the First Fathers*, 3). "Uniting the distant members with their head and among themselves" is an explicit Ignatian ideal (34). This union, built on a love for the Lord and for one another, is what brought us together. Xavier, who went so far as to wear over his heart a scrap of paper with a list of those companions, remained affectively in close touch with them despite the immense distances.

This sharing of affection goes far beyond any juridical bond and makes us a genuine family, with all that is thereby implied in support, understanding, trust, endurance, family confidences and respect. It makes us a tight-knit group for the mission in the bosom of the Church, for a greater service of our fellow man.

49. *Sensitivity for what is human:* this trait, which implies solidarity with each particular person, has always been a characteristic of our way of proceeding. It springs, as it would have to do, from Ignatius's own Christian experience. "Man," the first word in the Principle and Foundation that opens his Spiritual Exercises and the point of departure for the spiritual experience that Ignatius lived and taught to countless others, is also, transcended and deepened in all its plenitude, the ultimate object of life viewed as contemplation (35).

Ignatius's - and the Society's - esteem for non-immanent humanisms and all human values, wherever they exist, lies at the root of the pluralism that the Society has always lived in its work of evangelization understood as an inculturation of the gospel, its incarnation in cultures. That lofty *sensus hominis* is what makes service a typical trait of Ignatian spirituality.

50. *Rigor and quality:* our service and our way of proceeding must always manifest these two characteristics. They have nothing to do with prestige or class-loyalties: our insistence on quality in the service we give flows from a realization of how important the message is, and from a respect and love for man the receiver of that message. To perform that service in a

frivolous or demagogic manner, or with sectarian dogmatism, would be to cheapen it. Since he personally lives that message himself, the Jesuit should cultivate that self-discipline without which intellectual rigor and competence are impossible, not to mention what CG 32 called that "serious and demanding study of theology, philosophy and the human sciences, which are ever more necessary if we are to understand and try to resolve the problems of the world" (36).

That same careful preparation and competence will equip the Jesuit to judge ideas and attitudes, and develop in him a critical spirit that is all the more necessary today when ideas are confused and seductive ideologies woo us everywhere (37).

51. *Love for the Church:* this love takes in the entire Church, the whole people of God, both hierarchy and laity, and is a positive commitment of the whole person to building up the one Church of Christ. This love, which has always been part of our way of proceeding, takes concrete forms:

- It is a love rich in openness and respect for every believer and for his faith. Especially for the faith of simple folk (38), serving them on their own level and accepting them with all the spontaneous manifestations of their popular religiosity.

- A love that means "keeping our minds ready and eager to give entire obedience" (39) to our pastors, co-operating receptively and actively in their teaching office.

- A love that implies our support of the research of those who cultivate the sacred sciences to enrich our understanding of revelation; and on a humbler level, this love impels us to give religious instruction, even to children and uneducated persons" (40).

- A love that makes us live, feel and suffer the Church's problems and limitations as our own, offering with the freedom and humility of the sons of God the charitable service of a constructive criticism that is, in effect, a self-criticism.

52. *A sense of being the "least Society"* (41): we serve doubly when we serve with no desire of promoting any interests or cause of our own, quietly, with a sense that we are serving together with many others, collaborating with them and with all men of good will (42).

Moreover, we should prefer an anonymous service, for thus we come closer to the Third Degree of Humility, which the Exercises suggest as the supreme way of following Christ, provided there be "equal praise and glory for his Divine Majesty" (43).

This desire to serve without being noticed not only is an interior attitude, but it will be reflected too in our deliberate exterior simplicity, a way of proceeding that is "ordinary in external matters" and follows the "common and approved usage of reputable priests" (44).

53. *A sense of discernment:* this too is distinctive of our way of proceeding; indeed, it is certainly a gift of the Spirit, even though man can, as Ignatius's whole life illustrates, gradually train himself to it with the help of the same Spirit and submit to its pedagogy.

Our aim is to become men who, educated like Ignatius in a long and never ended experience of the Lord, are constantly searching for and listening to the Lord, and who acquire a certain supernatural flair for knowing where he is and where he is not.

This sense of discernment, in its inevitable prophetic aspects, is basic and previous to any evangelizing activity. Without this sense, such activity ceases to be authentic, and instead of building up the Society and the Church, it destroys them.

54. *Delicacy in the matter of chastity:* obviously, I am not referring to the promise we made to God, in our second vow, of remaining consecrated celibates, nor to the practice of the virtue of chastity. Neither of these two things is part of our way of proceeding, since both are common to all religious.

Yet Ignatius, who devoted only a single phrase (a last-minute addition, apparently) in his Constitutions to chastity, was lavish in practical rules for helping Jesuits

not only to *be* outstanding in this matter, but to *be known* as outstanding in it: thus he gave us the rules of modesty, of touch, of having a companion, the account of conscience, cloister, etc. Very soon the circumspection and prudence of Jesuits in this area became proverbial. Some even have imagined that Jesuits had a special herb in their diet that helps them in this matter (45)!

Today, when the sociological and cultural conditions in which we work foster a general permissiveness and naturalism, the Jesuit must, if he would proceed as the Society expects him to, in whatever surroundings and in whatever team-apostolate with men and women, so live and behave that everyone realizes he is consecrated to God alone.

55. *A sense of the Society:* neither the positive elements I have listed here nor those I excluded *per modum negationis* tell completely what our way of proceeding is or is not. Perhaps I should say simply that it is a living inspiration that transcends any a priori description. Yet this way of proceeding is the reason why every son of the Society will always act and react in a consistently Jesuit and Ignatian way, even in the most unforeseen circumstances.

Associated with our way of proceeding we invariably find that *sensus Societatis* which Nadal mentions, a sort of sixth sense or conditioned spiritual reflex connatural in those who live to the hilt the Society's charism. This *sensus Societatis* is, after all, nothing but an Ignatian form of the *sensus Christi* that every Jesuit cultivates in order to identify with Christ, particularly through the profound Christological experience of the Exercises.

Thus all Jesuits, whether young men in their first formation or the rest of us who are in permanent formation, must strive to maintain and quicken the *sensus Societatis* so as to preserve our identity as Jesuits and be able to meet the challenges of today. But we will never have this *sensus Societatis* unless we first have a deep and ingrained *sensus Christi*.

## 56. A prayer to Christ our Model:

Lord, meditating on "our way of proceeding," I have discovered that the ideal of *our* way of acting is *your* way of acting. For this reason I fix my eyes on you;\* the eyes of faith see your face as you appear in the gospel. I am one of those about whom St. Peter says: "You did not see him, yet you love him; and still without seeing him, you are already filled with a joy so glorious that it cannot be described, because you believe".\*

Lord, you yourself have told us: "I have given you an example to follow".\* I want to follow you in that way so that I can say to others: "Be imitators of me as I am of Christ".\* Although I am not able to mean it as literally as St. John, I would like to be able to proclaim, at least through the faith and wisdom that you give me, what I have heard, what I have seen with my eyes, what I have contemplated and touched with my hands concerning the Word of Life. The Life manifested itself, and I have seen it and give witness."\* Although not with bodily eyes, certainly through the eyes of faith.\*

Above all, give me that *sensus Christi*\* about which St. Paul speaks: that I may feel with your feelings, with the sentiments of your heart, which basically are love for your Father\* and love for mankind.\* No one has shown more charity than you, giving your life for your friends\* with that *kenosis*\* of which St. Paul speaks. But I would like to imitate you not only in your feelings but also in everyday life, acting, as far as possible, as you did.

Teach me your way of relating to disciples, to sinners, to children,\* to Pharisees, Pilates and Herods; also to John the Baptist before his birth\* and afterward at the Jordan.\* Teach me how you deal with your dis-

ciples, especially the most intimate: with Peter,\* with John,\* with the traitor Judas.\*  
 Jn 19:26-27; Peter,\* with John,\* with the traitor Judas.\*  
 Jn 13:26; How delicately you treat them on Lake Tibe-  
 Lk 22:48 rias, even preparing breakfast for them!  
 How you wash their feet!\*

Jn 21:9; May I learn from you and from your ways,  
 Jn 13:1-20 as St. Ignatius did:\* how to eat and drink;  
 Mk 2:16; how to attend banquets;\* how to act when  
 Jn 4:8,31-33 hungry or thirsty,\* when tired from the  
 Jn 2:1; ministry,\* when in need of rest or sleep.\*  
 Mt 4:2;  
 Jn 4:7

Teach me how to be compassionate to the  
 Mt 9:36; suffering,\* to the poor, the blind, the lame,  
 14:14; and the lepers; show me how you revealed  
 15:32 your deepest emotions, as when you shed  
 Lk 7:13; 19:41 tears,\* or when you felt sorrow and anguish  
 to the point of sweating blood and needed an  
 Mt 26:37-39 angel to console you.\* Above all, I want to  
 learn how you supported the extreme pain of  
 the cross, including the abandonment by your  
 Mt 27:46 Father.\*

Your humanity flows out from the gospel,  
 which shows you as noble, amiable, exemplary  
 and sublime, with a perfect harmony between  
 your life and your doctrine. Even your  
 enemies said: "Master, we know that you are  
 truthful, that you teach the way of God in  
 truth and care not for any man, for you re-  
 Mt 22:16 gard not the person of men".\* The gospel  
 shows your virile manner, hard on yourself  
 Mt 8:20 in privations and wearying work,\* but for  
 others full of kindness, with a consuming  
 Mt 20:28 longing to serve.\*  
 Cf Ph 2:7

It is true that you were hard on those  
 in bad faith, but your goodness drew the  
 multitudes; the sick and infirm felt  
 instinctively that you would have pity on  
 Mt 9:36; them;\* you so electrified the crowds that  
 14:14 they forgot to eat;\* with a knowledge of  
 Mk 3:20 everyday life you could offer parables that  
 everyone understood, parables both beautiful  
 and vigorous. Your friendship was for every-



Jn 15:15            one,\* but you manifested a special love for  
 Jn 13:23; 19:26    some, like John,\* and a special friendship  
 Jn 11:36            for some, like Lazarus, Martha and Mary.\*  
 Show me how you expressed joy at festive  
 Jn 2:1              gatherings; for example, at Cana.\*

                    You were in constant contact with your  
 Father in prayer and your formal prayer,  
 often lasting all night, was certainly a  
 source of the luminous transcendence noticed  
 by your contemporaries.\* Your presence  
 instilled respect, consternation, trembling,  
 admiration, and sometimes even profound fear  
 in various types and classes of people.

                    Teach me your way of looking at people:  
 as you glanced at Peter after his denial,\*  
 as you penetrated the heart of the rich  
 young man\* and the hearts of your disciples.\*

                    I would like to meet you as you really  
 are, since your image changes those with  
 whom you come into contact. Remember John  
 the Baptist's first meeting with you?\* And  
 the centurion's feeling of unworthiness?\*  
 And the amazement of all those who saw mir-  
 acles and other wonders?\* How you impressed  
 your disciples,\* the rabble in the Garden of  
 Olives,\* Pilate\* and his wife\* and the centu-  
 rion at the foot of the cross.\*

                    The same Peter who was vividly impressed  
 by the miraculous catch of fish also felt pro-  
 foundly the tremendous distance between  
 himself, a sinner, and you. He and the other  
 Apostles were overcome with fear.\*

                    I would like to hear and be impressed by  
 your manner of speaking, listening, for ex-  
 ample, to your discourse in the synagogue at  
 Capharnaum\* or the Sermon on the Mount where  
 your audience felt you "taught as one who  
 has authority" and not as the Scribes.\*

                    In the words of grace that came from your  
 mouth the authority of the Spirit of God was  
 evident.\* No one doubted that the superhuman

Lk 4:22,32

majesty came from a close bond between Jesus and God. We have to learn from you the secret of such a close bond or union with God: in the more trivial, everyday actions, with that total dedication to loving the Father and all humanity, the perfect *kenosis* at the service of others, aware of the delicate humanity that makes us feel close to you and of that divine majesty that makes us feel so distant from such grandeur.

Give me that grace, that *sensus Christi*, your very heartbeat, that I may live all of my life, interiorly and exteriorly, proceeding and discerning with your spirit, exactly as you did during your mortal life.

Teach us your way so that it becomes our way today, so that we may come closer to the great ideal of St. Ignatius: to be companions of Jesus, collaborators in the work of redemption, each one of us an *alter Christus*.

I beg Mary, your Most Holy Mother who contributed so much to your formation and way of acting, to help me and all sons of the Society to become her sons, just like you, born of her and living with her all the days of your life.

★ ★ ★

# NOTES

1. MHSI MI, Epp XII, 321. Letter to Juan de Verdolay, July 24, 1537.
2. MI Const. I, 32.
3. MI, Epp I, 149. *Obras Completas de San Ignacio*, Madrid, BAC, 3rd ed., 1977, 671. (Hereafter we will refer to this source merely as "BAC".)
4. "Despite so much opposition and contradictions and divergent views, [the Vicar of Christ our Lord] has approved and confirmed *our entire way of proceeding*, our living according to a plan and agreement, and with full permission to have Constitutions" MI Epp I, 154.
5. MI Font Narr I, 234.
6. On March 15, 1540, the eve of his leaving Rome for Lisbon and the Indies, Xavier signs this statement about the Constitutions that were to be drafted: "I, Francis, thus affirm: that since His Holiness permits *our way of life*, I am in favor of whatever the Society decides about all our Constitutions, rules and *way of life*" (Mon Xav I, 811). And on January 15, 1544, when he heard of the oral approval given to the Society, he writes from Cochín to the companions at Rome: "Among the many favors that God our Lord has done for me in this life and still does each day, this one stands out, that during my lifetime I saw what I had so much yearned for: the confirmation of our Rule and *way of life*" (ibid., 294). Cf MI Epp I, 142, Letter of December 19, 1538.
7. Cf note 2.
8. MI Font Narr II, 236. Nadal V, 608; cf also 548 and 661.
9. Nadal V, 52, n. 33.
10. Ibid., 199, n. 184. Cf also 304, n. 69; 330, n. 86; 490, n. 3; 662, n. 42; 785, n. 13.
11. MI Font Narr II, 3-5; III, 515, n. 147.

12. Nadal V, 442-443, n. 224. Cf *ibid.*, 57-60.
13. MI Font Narr III, 790.
14. Nadal, Pláticas de Coimbra, 75-76, n. 14.
15. Nadal Epp IV, 651. Cf also MHSI Reglas, 490.
16. MI Epp III, 510. BAC, 804, n. 6.
17. Formula, 1.
18. MI Const I, 162.
19. Mon Paed II, 131.
20. MI Epp I, 179. BAC, 677.
21. MI Epp I, 386. BAC, 705.
22. MI Epp XII, 239. BAC, 779.
23. MI Epp VII, 680. BAC, 956.
24. MI Epp III, 41, n. 12.
25. MHSI Regulae, Praefatio, 3\*.
26. *Ibid.*
27. About the number of Jesuits during Ignatius's lifetime, see André Ravier, *Saint Ignace fonde la Compagnie*, DDB, Paris, 288.
28. Nadal, Pláticas de Coimbra, 55, n. 24.
30. Nadal V, 723 and IV, 614. See also the trilingual edition *Textos Ignacianos*, Doc. I, CIS, Roma, 1974.
31. Formula, 1 and 3.
32. Autobiography, 96; Spiritual Diary, 8, 29-31.
33. Formula, 4; CG 32, 2:13-14, 20, 30-32.
34. Formula, 3 and 5; Const [4, 42, 398, 478, 499, 565, 566, 640, 816]; CG 32, 2:28.
35. Const VIII.
36. EE 230-237.
37. CF 32, 4:35.
38. Formula, 4 and 6; Letter "On Perfection," 1; CG 32, 2:25.

- 39. EE 362.
- 40. EE 353.
- 41. Const [69, 528].
- 42. Const [1, 134, 190, 318, 638].
- 43. CG 32, 2:29.
- 44. EE 167.
- 45. Formula, 6; Const [8, 580].
- 46. Nicolás Orlandini, *Historia S.I.. Pars Prima*. V, 62.  
Rome, 1614. MHSI Epp Mixtae I, 266.

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